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I. INTRODUCTION
In theory, mortgagees should be unconcerned when insolvency forces
mortgagors to file bankruptcy. Indeed, protection from such occurrences is the
very reason for creation of mortgage security interests. In reality, however,
mortgagees' rights, contractual and statutory, are often substantially affected
by federal bankruptcy law, as many learn when they are forced into bank-
* Copyright 1985, Grant S. Nelson.
** Enoch H. Crowder Professor of Law, University of Missouri-Columbia.
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ruptcy court to defend their security interests from the trustee's attack.' The
purpose of this article is to provide a general overview of the impact of mort-
gagor bankruptcy on the real estate mortgagee, to explore in detail certain
recent developments that are especially troublesome to such mortgagees and to
propose certain changes in state foreclosure practices that would, it is hoped,
obviate the problems that gave rise to those developments.
The Bankruptcy Code (the "Code") provides for three types of bank-
ruptcy proceedings: Chapter 72 ("straight bankruptcy"), Chapter 11,1 and
Chapter 13." Straight bankruptcy entails the liquidation of the debtor's non-
exempt assets to satisfy his or her creditors according to the priority and
amount of their claims. Such a proceeding ultimately discharges the debtor of
most pre-bankruptcy debts. It is the most common type of bankruptcy pro-
ceeding. Relief may be sought by the debtor ("voluntary") or by creditors
("involuntary"). Chapter 11 proceedings, on the other hand, provide for the
reorganization of corporate and other business debtors.5 Rehabilitation, not
liquidation, is the purpose of such proceedings. Reorganization plans can re-
sult in extension of debts and broad judicial control over both secured and
unsecured creditors. Finally, Chapter 13 is to some extent a Chapter 11
equivalent for individuals. Such proceedings are aimed at the rehabilitation of
the debtor by extension and reduction of both unsecured and certain secured
claims. Such a proceeding may be used by an individual who owes less than
$100,000 in unsecured debt and $350,000 in secured debt.6
The most immediate impact of debtor bankruptcy on the real estate mort-
gagee is the automatic stay. Under section 362(a) of the Code, all foreclosure
proceedings, whether judicial or power of sale, are automatically stayed by the
filing of any of the three types of bankruptcy proceedings.7 The stay is applica-
ble whether or not the foreclosure was initiated prior to the bankruptcy peti-
tion.8 Moreover, in Chapter 13 proceedings the stay is also applicable to fore-
closure and other proceedings against third persons who have guaranteed the
bankrupt's consumer debt or put up property to secure it.9 The only significant
exception from the stay is for foreclosure "actions" brought by the Secretary
of HUD on federally insured mortgages on property consisting of five or more
1. See infra text accompanying notes 15-33.
2. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-66 (1982).
3. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1101-74 (1982).
4. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 1301-30 (1982).
5. Individuals can use Chapter 11, although the typical case is a business case.
See 11 U.S.C. § 109(d) (1982).
6. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (1982).
7. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(4) (1982). See generally Whelan, Lenders' Rights
in Bankruptcy Stays, MORTGAGE BANKER, Oct. 1984, at 57; Nimmer, Real Estate
Creditors and the Automatic Stay: A Study in Behavioral Economics, 1983 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 281; Nimmer, Secured Creditors and the Automatic Stay: Variable Bargain Mod-
els of Fairness, 68 MINN. L. REV. 1 (1983).
8. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1982).
9. See I1 U.S.C. § 1301 (1982).
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living units.10 The impact of the stay on the real estate mortgagee can be
substantial. For example, a mortgagee can be in the middle of a complex judi-
cial foreclosure in state court, and the filing of a bankruptcy petition can bring
the action to an absolute halt. Not only will any foreclosure consummated in
violation of the stay be ineffective, the mortgagee risks being punished for con-
tempt as well."1
II. STRAIGHT BANKRUPTCY
As noted in the Introduction, the filing of a petition in straight bank-
ruptcy, stays any pending or planned foreclosure proceeding. However, assum-
ing the mortgage is valid, the trustee has a legitimate interest in the mort-
gaged real estate only if the mortgagor-debtor has "equity" in that real
estate-the amount by which the value of the property exceeds the total
amount of mortgage debt against it. If a mortgagee seeks relief from the stay,
proves the non-existence of such equity, the trustee should abandon the real
estate'to the mortgagee who then can proceed to foreclose.1 2 If equity is found
to exist, the real estate will be sold by the bankruptcy court, either (1) subject
to the existing mortgages and other liens, or (2) free and clear of them.13 If
the latter course is chosen, those liens will be transferred to the sale proceeds
and satisfied in order of their priority.1 4 Suppose, for example, that E-1 has a
valid first mortgage on Blackacre with a $60,000 balance and that E-2 has a
valid second mortgage on it with a $15,000 balance. If the trustee determines
that Blackacre is worth less than $75,000, she will release it and either lienor
will be free to foreclose under state law. If, however, Blackacre proves to be
worth more than $75,000, she will either sell it subject to the foregoing mort-
gages or free and clear of them. If she chooses the latter course, the two mort-
gages will attach to the sale proceeds and be satisfied in order of their priority.
Because the trustee represents the interests of the bankrupt's unsecured
creditors, her primary goal is to enlarge the asset pool available to satisfy their
claims. Since each mortgage invalidated usually serves that purpose, she will
be especially watchful for opportunities to attack vulnerable security interests.
The Code affords her an impressive arsenal of weapons in this regard. Perhaps
most basic is section 558, which gives the trustee "the benefit of any defense
available to the debtor" against the mortgagee even if the debtor waives it
after the commencement of bankruptcy.1 5 Thus, for example, to the extent
10. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(8) (1982).
11. See W. COLLIER, COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY § 362.11 (L. King 15th ed.
1984) [hereinafter cited as COLLIER].
12. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 554, 362(d) (1982); In re Thayer, 38 Bankr. 412, 422
(Bankr. D. Vt. 1984); see also Whelan, supra note 7, at 58; In re Victor Builders, Inc.,
418 F.2d 880, 882 (9th Cir. 1969); In re Ira Haupt & Co., 398 F.2d 607, 612-14 (2d
Cir. 1968); In re Polumbo, 271 F. Supp. 640, 643 (W.D. Va. 1967).
13. See 11 U.S.C. § 363(0 (1982); COLLIER, supra note 11, § 363.07.
14. COLLIER, supra note 11, § 363.07.
15. See 11 U.S.C. § 558 (1982); In re Hayes, 39 Bankr. 1 (Bankr. C.D. Ill.
1985]
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that a debtor would be able to invalidate a mortgage based on fraud, usury,
incapacity or other grounds, so too will the trustee. Also important is section
544(a)(3) which affords the trustee, irrespective of knowledge on her part, the
status of a bona fide purchaser of real property from the debtor who has per-
fected under state law.16 Such status can be utilized whether such a purchaser
actually exists or not.17 Consequently, the trustee will always be able to defeat
any mortgage of the debtor that is unrecorded as of the commencement of
bankruptcy. Because she is deemed to have perfected under state law, the type
of state recording act (e.g., whether race-notice, notice, or pure race)' 8 and its
requirements become irrelevant.
While section 544(a)(3) permits the trustee to defeat any prior unre-
corded mortgage, situations may arise where it is to her advantage to be able
to assert its priority. Suppose, for example, that after a mortgage on Blackacre
is executed, but never recorded, a second mortgage is recorded by another
creditor who, under the applicable state recording act, qualifies as a bona fide
purchaser as against that unrecorded mortgage. The debtor-mortgagor then
files a bankruptcy petition. While section 544(a)(3), as noted earlier, allows
the trustee to avoid the unrecorded mortgage, it does not prevent the second
mortgage, which is admittedly valid, from being promoted in priority. How-
ever, section 551 of the Code then comes to the rescue. Under the latter provi-
sion, a trustee who avoids a senior lien becomes subrogated to the rights of the
senior lienor up to the amount of the senior debt.' 9 For example, suppose the
unrecorded mortgage has a balance of $10,000 and the recorded second mort-
gage a balance of $20,000. If the real estate is sold by the bankruptcy court
for $25,000, the trustee as subrogee will have a right to $10,000 and the sec-
ond mortgagee will receive $15,000.
Certain mortgages may be vulnerable to a fraudulent conveyance at-
tack.2 0 Under section 548 of the Code, transfers made by the debtor within
one year of bankruptcy may be set aside by the trustee if they were made with
the intent to "hinder, delay or defraud" any creditor to which the debtor was
or became indebted.2" Thus, for example, suppose a debtor, in order to conceal
his substantial equity in Blackacre, grants mortgagee a mortgage on it within
a year of filing a bankruptcy petition. The trustee will be able to set aside the
mortgage. Moreover, as is explored in detail later in this article,22 the con-
1983).
16. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(3) (1982); In re Duffy-Irvine Assocs., 39 Bankr.
525 (Bankr. E.D. Penn. 1984); COLLIER, supra note 11, § 544.02; Jackson, Avoiding
Powers in Bankruptcy, 36 STAN. L. REv. 725, 732-42 (1984).
17. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(a)(3) (1982).
18. See generally R. CUNNINGHAM, W. STOEBUCK & D. WHITMAN, PROPERTY
§ 11.9 (1984).
19. See 11 U.S.C. § 551 (1982).
20. See 11 U.S.C. § 548 (1982).
21. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1) (1982); see also Jackson, supra note 16, at 777-
86.
22. See infra text accompanying notes 162-219.
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structive fraud provision of section 548 has increasingly become the basis for
setting aside certain pre-bankruptcy foreclosure sales of the debtor's real es-
tate that yield less than its "reasonably equivalent value." The trustee may
have a further fraudulent conveyance weapon. To the extent that state fraudu-
lent conveyance law confers on unsecured creditors broader powers to avoid
debtor mortgages than are afforded by its section 548 counterpart, section
544(b) of the Code empowers the trustee to take advantage of that state law, a
matter which is considered elsewhere in this article.23 Finally, many mortgages
given within ninety days of the mortgagor's bankruptcy will be voidable by the
trustee as a preference under section 547 of the Act.2 A significant policy
embodied in the bankruptcy law is that similarly situated creditors be treated
equally. However, once a debtor becomes financially unstable, creditors com-
monly violate that policy by seeking to gain advantage vis Ai vis their creditor
brethren. Often this entails acquiring real estate mortgages from the debtor to
secure pre-existing debt. To the extent that such mortgages are granted by an
insolvent mortgagor within ninety days of bankruptcy and they would other-
wise enable the creditor to realize more on its claim than it otherwise would in
a straight bankruptcy liquidation, they constitute voidable preferences.
25
Moreover, there is a presumption of debtor insolvency during this ninety day
period.2" Moreover, if the creditor is an "insider," 27 the preference period is
one year rather than ninety days.28Another preference problem arises because
of a bankruptcy policy against secret and unrecorded liens. Even though a
mortgage is valid between the parties at the time of its execution, for bank-
ruptcy purposes the transfer is deemed to occur on the date the mortgage is
recorded if recordation occurs more than ten days after the mortgage is exe-
cuted.29 Since the transfer under such circumstances occurs as of the date of
recording, it will be treated as a transfer for an antecedent debt even though
present value was given when the mortgage became effective between the par-
ties. For example, suppose that on January 15, mortgagor, who is insolvent,
borrows $10,000 from creditor and the latter takes back a mortgage on Black-
acre as security. On February 10 creditor records the mortgage. On March 15,
mortgagor files a bankruptcy petition. Even though the $10,000 loan would
otherwise represent new value,30 because of the tardy recording, the transfer
will be deemed to be for an antecedent debt within ninety days of bankruptcy.
23. See 11 U.S.C. § 544(b) (1982); see, e.g., In re Penn Packing Co., 42 Bankr.
502 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984); see infra text accompanying notes 214-16; see generally
Note, Good Faith and Fraudulent Conveyances, 97 HARv. L. REv. 495 (1983).
24. See 11 U.S.C. § 547 (1982); Ross, The Impact of Section 547 of the Bank-
ruptcy Code upon Secured and Unsecured Creditors, 69 MINN. L. REv. 39 (1984).
25. Id.
26. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(0 (1982).
27. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(25) (1982).
28. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b)(4)(B) (1982).
29. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 547(e)(1)(A), 547(e)(2) (1982); see also COLLIER, supra
note 11, § 547.44.
30. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(a)(2) (1982).
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Accordingly, the mortgage can be set aside as a voidable preference.
While the foregoing trustee's powers are numerous and important, it
would be a mistake to overemphasize their danger for the real estate mort-
gage. Most straight bankruptcy proceedings are consumated relatively rapidly,
and normally the mortgage security and lien priority will be preserved. It is
true that in some instances, a trustee may delay temporarily the disposition of
income-producing real estate in an attempt to accumulate some of those rents
for the benefit of unsecured creditors. This problem is examined in a later
section. 31 By and large, however, the most significant impact of a straight
bankruptcy on the mortgage will be the loss of part or all of its deficiency
judgment and that should pose no problem to the prudent mortgagee who
made sure initially that the debt was well-secured.
III. THE CHAPTER 11 REORGANIZATION
Because the purpose of a Chapter 11 proceeding is the rehabilitation
rather than the liquidation of the debtor, the debtor typically continues to op-
erate the estate as a "debtor-in-possession." 32 Parties in interest (usually credi-
tors) may obtain the appointment of a trustee only for cause "including fraud,
dishonesty, incompetence, or gross mismanagement" on the part of the
debtor33 or where appointment is otherwise in such parties' "best interests."3"
The appointment of a trustee is considered "an extraordinary remedy"35 and
there is thus a strong presumption in favor of the debtor remaining in posses-
sion, at least through the plan formulation peridd. 31 Moreover, the debtor-in-
possession is entitled to exercise the avoidance powers of a Chapter 7 trustee.3 7
From the moment the mortgagor files a Chapter 11 petition, the mortga-
gee is stayed from foreclosing. 38 Usually the stay will remain in effect at least
while a reorganization plan is being formulated and often during its execution.
However, under section 362 of the Code, the bankruptcy court may
terminat[e], annul, modify or condition such stay (1) for cause, including the
lack of adequate protection of an interest in property of such [mortgagee]; or
(2) with respect to a stay of an act against property, if -(A) the [mortgagor]
does not have an equity in such property; and (B) such property is not neces-
sary to an effective reorganization.3"
The first ground for relief has provided some difficulty for the bankruptcy
courts. Some courts, for example, suggest that "adequate protection" exists if
31. See infra § VII.
32. See Collier, supra note 11, § 1104.01; see also 11 U.S.C. § 1107 (1982).
33. See 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (1982).
34. See 11 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(2) (1982); COLLIER, supra note 11, § 11.04.01(d).
35. COLLIER, supra note 11, § 1104.01(b).
36. Id.
37. See 11 U.S.C. § 1107 (1982).
38. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (1982).
39. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (1982).
(Vol. 50
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there is an "equity cushion" in the mortgaged real estate.40 Others stress that
the foregoing language is designed to protect against post-filing decline in the
value of the real estate.4' In a few instances, mortgagor failure to pay real
estate taxes or to keep the mortgaged premises insured have been deemed to
cause a lack of adequate protection.4 2 When such adequate protection is lack-
ing, section 361 sets out three permissible ways to provide it.4" As summarized
by Professor Kennedy,
[First, the trustee may be required to make periodic cash payments to the
[mortgagee] in an amount sufficient to compensate for the decrease in the
value of the [mortgagee's] interest resulting from the stay. Second, the [mort-
gagee] may be provided with an alternative or additional lien equal in value
to the decrease in the value of the [mortgagee's] interest resulting from the
stay. Finally, any other relief may be granted that will give the [mortgagee]
realization of the 'indubitable equivalent' of its interest in property.
4
The latter alternative is a "catch-all" concept that awaits case by case devel-
opment. Nevertheless, as one commentator has stressed, "[g]iving a creditor
which holds security of the highest quality with an ample cushion alternative
security of dubious value or of a value barely that of the debt would not meet
'indubitable equivalent' standard.
45
The second ground for stay relief is more commonly relied upon by mort-
gagees. Under this approach two requirements must be satisfied. First, the
mortgagor must lack equity in the mortgaged real estate and second, that real
estate must not be necessary to an "effective reorganization." 46 The meaning
of the term "equity" has proved especially troublesome for the bankruptcy
courts. Under the predominate approach, "equity" refers to "the difference
between the value of the property and all encumbrances against it.' 47 A sizea-
40. See, e.g., Hagendorfer v. Marlette, 42 Bankr. 17 (S.D. Ala. 1984); In re
Jamaica House, Inc., 31 Bankr. 192 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1983); In re Penn York Mfg., 14
Bankr. 51 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1981); In re Tucker, 5 Bankr. 180 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
1980).
41. See, e.g., In re Development, Inc., 36 Bankr. 998 (Bankr. D. Hawaii 1984);
In re Palmer River Realty, 26 Bankr. 138 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1983); La Jolla Mortgage
Fund v. Rancho El Cajon Assocs., 18 Bankr. 283 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1982); In re BBT,
11 Bankr. 224 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1981); In re Gaim Dev. Corp., 9 Bankr. 17 (Bankr.
S.D. Fla. 1981); In re Riviera Inn, 7 Bankr. 725 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1980).
42. In re Jenkins, 36 Bankr. 788 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984); In re Ausherman, 34
Bankr. 393 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1983); In re Jamaica House, Inc., 31 Bankr. 192 (Bankr.
D. Vt. 1983).
43. See 11 U.S.C. § 361 (1982).
44. Kennedy, Automatic Stays Under the New Bankruptcy Law, 12 U. MICH.
J.L. REF. 343-44 (1979); see In re Development, Inc., 36 Bankr. 998 (Bankr. D. Hawaii
1984).
45. COLLIER, supra note 11, § 361.01[4].
46. See I1 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2) (1982).
47. See, e.g., In re Development, Inc., 36 Bankr. 998 (Bankr. D. Hawaii 1984);
In re Faires, 34 Bankr. 549 (Bankr. D. Wash. 1983); In re Trina-Dee, Inc., 26 Bankr.
152 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983); In re Koopmans, 22 Bankr. 395 (Bankr. D. Utah 1982);
In re Crescent Beach Inn, 22 Bankr. 161 (Bankr. D. Maine 1982); La Jolla Mortgage
1985]
7
Nelson: Nelson: Impact of Mortgagor Bankruptcy on the Real Estate Mortgagee:
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1985
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
ble majority of decisions, however, take the position that the term "means the
difference between the value of the property and the lien which is the subject
of [the request to stay relief], along with any liens senior thereto."48 Under
this view, it "makes no difference how many junior encumbrances are out-
standing against the subject property so long as the [mortgagor] has a sub-
stantial and meaningful equity cushion over and above the senior encum-
brances. 14 9 Because it enhances the likelihood that equity will exist and that
relief from the stay will thus be denied, the minority view is especially appeal-
ing to junior lienholders. By keeping the stay in effect they postpone the day of
reckoning when they must either satisfy the senior indebtedness or suffer fore-
closure of their liens. 50
If the court finds that equity exists, it must then determine whether the
mortgaged real estate is "necessary to an effective reorganization." 51 As one
court has stressed, it is "not enough for a debtor to argue that the automatic
stay should continue because it needs the secured property in order to propose
a reorganization. . . . The key word . . . is 'effective'. ' 52 The mere fact that
the real estate is essential to the survival of the mortgagor's business is insuffi-
cient. 53 Rather, the mortgagor is required to demonstrate that there is "a rea-
sonable likelihood of a successful reorganization within a reasonable period of
tim e. ,54
Fund v. Rancho El Cajon Assocs., 18 Bankr. 283 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1982); In re Saint
Peter's School, 16 Bankr. 404 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982); First Conn. Small Business
Inv. Co. v. Ruark, 7 Bankr. 46 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1980); In re Dallasta, 7 Bankr. 883
(Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1980); Whelan, supra note 7, at 58; Note, Automatic Stay Under the
1978 Bankruptcy Code: An Equitable Roadblock to Secured Creditor Relief, 17 SAN
DIEGo L. REV. 1113, 1123 (1980).
48. In re Faires, 34 Bankr. 549, 551 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. 1983). But see, e.g.,
In re Cote, 27 Bankr. 510, 512-13 (Bankr. D. Or. 1983); In re Palmer River Realty,
Inc., 26 Bankr. 138, 140 (Bankr. D.R.I. 1983); In re Certified Mortgage Corp., 25
Bankr. 662, 663 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1982); In re Spring Garden Foliage, Inc., 15
Bankr. 140, 143 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1981); In re Wolford Enterprises, 11 Bankr. 571,
574 (Bankr. S.D. W. Va. 1981).
49. In re Spring Garden Foliage, Inc., 15 Bankr. 140, 143 (Bankr. M.D. Fla.
1981).
50.
There may be many instances when the holder of a lien inferior to the lien of
a plaintiff does not want relief from the stay afforded to the plaintiff. In a
foreclosure a junior lienholder is faced with the possibility that unless it
purchases the interests of those holders of superior liens it will lose any recov-
ery upon its lien. The junior lienholder may prefer to negotiate with the
debtor for different payment terms or a reduction in the amount due to it.
In re Cote, 27 Bankr. 510, 513 (Bankr. D. Or. 1983).
51. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d)(2)(B) (1982).
52. In re Clark Technical Assocs., 9 Bankr. 738, 740 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1981).
53. In re Development, Inc., 36 Bankr. 998, 1005 (Bankr. D. Hawaii 1984); In
re Mikole Developers, Inc., 14 Bankr. 524, 526 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1981).
54. In re Development, Inc., 36 Bankr. 998, 1005 (Bankr. D. Hawaii 1984); In
re Sundale Assocs., I 1 Bankr. 978, 980 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1981); see also In re Smith,
42 Bankr. 276, 277 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1984).
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On the surface it would seem that a mortgagee should invariably prefer
the "adequate protection" route to stay relief over the "no.equity-necessary
to an effective reorganization" approach. For example, suppose the mortgagee
can establish that an "equity cushion" no longer exists in the mortgaged real
estate. If such a showing is enough to show inadequate protection, why should
the mortgagee run the risk that mortgagor will be able to establish that the
real estate is necessary to an effective reorganization? Perhaps the answer lies
in the fact that if the court finds both a lack of equity and that the property is
unnecessary to an effective reorganization, it will invariably dissolve the stay
because, by definition, there is no reason for the court to retain control over it.
On the other hand, a finding of inadequate protection alone may simply result
in a decree ordering additional protection for the mortgagee or some modifica-
tion, rather than dissolution, of the stay. 51
A. The Reorganization Plan
Once the Chapter 11 petition is filed, the debtor has the exclusive right
for 120 days to submit a reorganization plan." That period may be extended
for "cause. '57 If the debtor files a plan within the specified period, no other
party can file a plan during the first 180 days of the case.58 If he fails to file a
plan, the other parties may file anytime after the expiration of the 120 day
period.59 Also, other parties can file at any time after a trustee has been ap-
pointed. 60 While the Code specifies in elaborate detail the contents of the
plan,6 1 two elements are especially important. First, the plan must classify
creditor claims and, second, it must describe in detail its treatment of each
creditor class. Claims generally are categorized as secured or unsecured. 2
Further distinctions are drawn based on the character or priority of the claims.
For example, while two separate debts secured by one mortgage on Blackacre
may be placed in one class, a junior mortgage on the same real estate arguably
will not be included in it.63 A detailed description of class treatment is re-
quired to place creditors on notice of the plan's prejudicial impact on them.
For example, the plan will often restructure existing debt to provide for re-
duced payments over an extended period of time. Moreover, it may provide for
55. See, e.g., In re Jenkins, 36 Bankr. 788, 789 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1984); In re
Jamaica House, Inc., 31 Bankr. 192, 195 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1983).
56. See 11 U.S.C. § 1121(b) (1982).
57. See 11 U.S.C. § 1121(d) (1982).
58. See 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c)(3) (1982).
59. See 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c)(2) (1982).
60. See 11 U.S.C. § 1121(c)(1) (1982).
61. See 11 U.S.C. § 1123 (1982).
62. See Comment, Real Estate Reorganizations: The New Bankruptcy Code v.
Chapter XII, 1980 U. ILL. L.F. 251, 255.
63. Id. A plan can only put a claim into a particular class if it is "substantially
similar" to other claims in the same class. See 11 U.S.C. § 1122(a) (1982).
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an actual reduction in the amount of unsecured claims.6 4
After the plan is filed, a period for soliciting creditor acceptance begins.6 5
Each creditor must receive a copy of the plan or a plan summary and a judi-
cially approved disclosure statement.66 Thereafter, the debtor solicits creditor
approval for the plan. In general, each class must either accept the plan or not
be "impaired" by it.67 If a class is unimpaired, it is deemed to have accepted
the plan.68
In general, in order for a class to qualify as "unimpaired," the plan may
not alter the legal, equitable, or contractual rights of any claim in the class.69
Importantly, under section 1124(2), a claim is not impaired even though the
plan cures a "default . . .that occurred before. . the commencement of the
case . ..and reinstates the maturity of [the] claim .. .as such maturity
existed before such default. °70 According to the legislative history of the fore-
going section, a
claim ... is unimpaired by curing the effect of a default and reinstating the
original term of an obligation when maturity was brought on or accelerated
by the default. The intervention of bankruptcy and the defaults represent a
temporary crisis which the plan of reorganization is intended to clear away.
The holder of a claim ...who under the plan is restored to his original
position, when others receive less or get nothing at all, is fortunate indeed and
has no cause to complain.71
While the foregoing section clearly authorized de-acceleration where a Chap-
ter 11 petition is filed before the mortgagee invokes a state foreclosure proce-
dure, courts disagree about the effect of a petition filed thereafter. Some hold
that a foreclosure judgment cuts off the mortgagor's de-acceleration rights,72
while others take the position that "it is the foreclosure sale rather than the
entry of judgment which cuts off" those rights.7 3 The latter approach is proba-
bly correct because in no event should de-acceleration be barred prior to the
termination of the mortgagor's equity of redemption. Such an approach was
utilized by the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit74 in a
64. Comment, supra note 62, at 256.
65. Id. at 255-56.
66. Id.
67. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(8) (1982).
68. See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(f) (1982).
69. See 11 U.S.C. § 1124 (1982).
70. See 11 U.S.C. § 1124(2) (1982).
71. S. REP. No. 989, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 120, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5787, 5906.
72. See, e.g., In re Monroe Park, 18 Bankr. 790, 791 (Bankr. D. Del. 1982); In
re St. Peter's School, 16 Bankr. 404, 409 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1982); In re Garner, 13
Bankr. 799, 801 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981) (which involves Chapter 13 bankruptcy, not
Chapter 1I).
73. In re Orlando Tennis World Dev. Co., 34 Bankr. 558, 560 (Bankr. M.D.
Fla. 1983); see also In re4Hewitt, 16 Bankr. 973, 977 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1982).
74. In re Madison Hotel Assocs., 749 F.2d 410 (7th Cir. 1984).
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Chapter 11 case where de-acceleration was sanctioned after the mortgagee
had obtained a judicial order of foreclosure, but before that order had been
reduced to judgment. The court emphasized that the result would have been
the same even had the judgment been obtained, and quoted approvingly from
a Seventh Circuit decision in an analogous Chapter 13 setting that pursuant to
Wisconsin law
a judgment of foreclosure does little more than determine that the mortgagor
is in default, the amount of principal and interest due and unpaid, the amount
due to the plaintiff mortgagee for taxes, etc. The judgment does not destroy
the lien of the mortgage but rather judicially determines the amount
thereof. . . .Accordingly, [the mortgagee's] failure to obtain a judgment of
foreclosure on its accelerated loan is of no consequence [here].7 5
Indeed, de-acceleration will probably be permitted after the foreclosure sale in
those states that afford the mortgagor statutory "post-sale" redemption
rights.7 6
Suppose, however, it is determined that a class is impaired. It is deemed
to accept the plan when a majority in number and two-thirds in total amount
of the claims approve the plan.7 Moreover, each member of an impaired class
must, in any event, either accept the plan or "receive or retain. . . on account
of [the plan] property of a value that is not less than the amount that such
holder would so receive or retain if the debtor were liquidated" in straight
bankruptcy.7 8 In addition, at least one class of impaired claims must accept
the plan.7 9 Finally, the plan must satisfy a "feasibility test."8 Under section
1 129(a)(11) of the Code, the bankruptcy court must determine that confirma-
tion "is not likely to be followed by the liquidation, or the need for further
financial reorganization, of the debtor. . . under the plan, unless such liquida-
tion or reorganization is proposed in the plan."8 " Under this standard, the
court must examine "the adequacy of the capital structure; the business's
earning power; economic conditions; management's ability; the probability of
the present management's continuation; and any other factors related to the
successful performance of the plan." 82 The court must satisfy itself that a rea-
75. Id. at 422 (quoting from In're Clark, 738 F.2d 869, 871 (7th Cir. 1984));
see infra text accompanying notes 130-32.
76. See In re Hewitt, 16 Bankr. 973, 977-80 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1982). There is
substantial authority in the Chapter 13 de-acceleration context. See infra notes 130-38
and accompanying text.
77. See 11 U.S.C. § 1126(c) (1982).
78. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(7)(A)(ii) (1982); Broude, Cramdown and Chapter
11 of the Bankruptcy Code: The Settlement Imperative, 39 Bus. LAw. 441, 448
(1984).
79. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(10) (1982).
80. Broude, supra note 78, at 448.
81. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(11) (1982).
82. In re Polytherm Indus., 33 Bankr. 823, 831 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1983); see
In re White, 41 Bankr. 227, 230 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984); In re Merrimack Valley
Oil Co., 32 Bankr. 485, 488 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1983); In re Huckabee Auto Co., 33
Bankr. 141, 145 n.2 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1981).
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sonable expectation of success exists.83
B. The Cram-Down Concept
Suppose that an impaired class fails to approve the plan. In that event,
the debtor may invoke the "cram-down" power of the Act to gain confirmation
of the plan over the objection of such a class.84 However, "cram-down" is per-
mitted only if the plan does not discriminate unfairly, and is fair and equita-
ble, with respect to each class of claims that is impaired under, and has not
accepted, the plan.85 The unfair discrimination concept applies "only to the
dissenting class and not to the plan in its entirety."8 6 While there is little case
law on this issue, there is authority that unfair discrimination exists when, for
example, trade debt claims are treated separately from the unsecured claims
of otherwise secured creditors. 87
To be "fair and equitable" in the dissenting real estate mortgagee credi-
tor context, section 1129(b)(2)(A) requires that one of three approaches be
followed.88 Under the first, the debtor can continue to operate the real estate
subject to the mortgage, but the mortgagee must receive present or deferred
cash payments equal to the amount of the mortgage debt and having a value
that is not less than the value of the mortgaged real estate.89 This approach
"allows the [mortgagee] to recover the face amount of the debt, because he
can elect to have his entire claim treated as secured even if in fact it is under-
secured. Moreover, the debtor must pay for any deferment or debt extension
at current interest rates ... ."90 Under the second alternative, the real estate
will be sold, but the mortgage lien will transfer to the sale proceeds.91 This
option will be unappealing to a debtor whose major asset is a single piece of
rental real estate. 2 The final approach allows a court to confirm a plan that
provides for the mortgagee to realize the "indubitable equivalent" of its
claim.9 3 As one commentator has noted, "[m]ore has been written on indubita-
ble equivalence with less effect than on almost any other area of bankruptcy
83. See In re White, 41 Bankr. 227, 230 (Bankr. M.D. Tenn. 1984); In re
Huckabee Auto Co., 33 Bankr. 141, 145 n.2 (Bankr. M.D. Ga. 1981).
84. See Broude, supra note 78 at 450-51; Comment, supra note 62, at 256-58.
See generally Coogan, Confirmation of a Plan Under the Bankruptcy Code, 32 CASE
W. REs. L. REv. 301 (1982); Pachulski, The Cram Down and Valuation Under Chap-
ter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, 58 N.C.L. REV. 925 (1980); Klee, All You Ever
Wanted to Know About Cram Down Under the Bankruptcy Code, 53 AM. BANKR. L.J.
133 (1979).
85. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (1982); Broude, supra note 78, at 450-51.
86. Broude, supra note 78, at 451.
87. Id.
88. See 11 U.S.C: § 1129(b)(2)(A) (1982).
89. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i) (1982).
90. Comment, supra note 62, at 273.
91. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(ii) (1982).
92. Comment, supra note 62, at 273.
93. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(iii) (1982).
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law.''94 Moreover, as one bankruptcy court noted, "there seems to be little
controlling precedential definition of indubitable equivalent." 95 Legislative his-
tory suggests that the concept was intended to encompass abandonment of the
security to the mortgagee or the granting of a lien on substitute security.96
IV. THE CHAPTER 13 "WAGE EARNER" PLAN
The Chapter 13 plan to some extent is to the salaried person or wage
earner what Chapter 11 is to the corporate or other commercial entity. Such a
proceeding may be utilized by an individual who has a regular income and
owes secured debt not in excess of $350,000 and unsecured debt not exceeding
$100,000. 9 7 The plan must be completed within three years of confirmation
unless the bankruptcy court approves a longer period not to exceed five
years. 98 The Chapter 13 trustee may exercise the same avoidance powers that
are available to his or her straight bankruptcy counterpart.99 However, the
trustee usually is passive and the debtor typically remains in possession of the
estate.'00 Even though the Act confers no general avoidance powers on the
debtor, bankruptcy courts frequently authorize the debtor to exercise such
powers.20 ' The legislative history of Chapter 13 provides a valuable insight
into its purpose and operation:
The purpose of Chapter 13 is to enable an individual, under court super-
vision and protection, to develop and perform under a plan for the repayment
of his debts over an extended period. In some cases, the plan will call for full
repayment. In others, it may offer creditors a percentage of their claims in
full settlement. During the repayment period, creditors may not harass the
debtor or seek to collect their debts. They must receive payments only under
the plan. This protection relieves the debtor from indirect and direct pressures
from creditors, and enables him to support himself and his dependents while
repaying his creditors at the same time.
The benefit to the debtor of developing a plan of repayment under chap-
ter 13, rather than opting for liquidation under chapter 7, is that it permits
the debtor to protect his assets. In a liquidation case, the debtor must surren-
der his nonexempt assets for liquidation and sale by the trustee. Under chap-
94. Broude, supra note 78, at 452.
95. In re Gemini at Dadeland, Ltd., 36 Bankr. 129, 130 (Bankr. S.D. Fla.
1983).
96. Broude, supra note 78, at 452.
97. See 11 U.S.C. § 109(e) (1982).
98. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(c) (1982).
99. See 11 U.S.C. § 1302(b) (1982).
100. See 11 U.S.C. § 1306(b) (1982); Henning, An Analysis of Durrett and its
Impact on Real and Personal Property Foreclosures: Some Proposed Modifications,
63 N.C.L. REv. 257, 283 n.154 (1984).
101. See, e.g., In re Hall, 752 F.2d 582 (11th Cir. 1985); In re Cowart, 43
Bankr. 110 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1984); In re Dudley, 38 Bankr. 666 (Bankr. M.D. Pa.
1984); In re Wheeler, 34 Bankr. 818 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1983); In re Worcester, 28
Bankr. 910 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1983); Henning, supra note 100, at 283 n.154.
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ter 13, the debtor may retain his property by agreeing to repay his creditors.
Chapter 13 also protects a debtor's credit standing far better than a straight
bankruptcy, because he is viewed by the credit industry as a better risk. In
addition, it satisfies many debtors' desire to avoid the stigma attached to
straight bankruptcy and to retain the pride attendant on being able to meet
one's obligations. The benefit to creditors is self-evident: their losses will be
significantly less than if their debtors opt for straight bankruptcy.
10 2
When the debtor has completed the plan, all unsecured debts are dis-
charged except alimony and child support obligations and those debts where
the last payment is to be made after the expiration of the plan.103 While the
plan can regulate or sometimes modify the repayment of installments and ar-
rearages on real estate mortgage debts (with the possible exception of mort-
gages on the debtor's principal residence) until the expiration of the plan, it
cannot affect those mortgage payments coming due after its expiration date.104
Thereafter, the debtor is required to make future payments as if no plan had
existed.
Real estate mortgagees in a Chapter 13 proceeding are subject to the
general stay provisions contained in section 362 of the Code.105 In addition,
there is a special stay provision protecting third parties who have guaranteed
the bankrupt's debt or put up property to secure it.106 Section 1301 provides
that "a creditor may not act, or commence or continue any civil action, to
collect all or any part of a consumer debt of the debtor from any individual
that is liable on such debt with the debtor or that secured such debt unless
such individual became liable on or secured such debt in the ordinary course
of such individual's business. 1 0 7 A "consumer debt" is one "incurred by an
individual primarily for a personal, family or household purpose."108 Thus,
while the stay imposed by section 362 bars a mortgagee from foreclosing
against the property of the mortgagor, section 1301 stays a mortgagee who
holds "consumer debt" from foreclosing against the real estate of third parties
that has been used as security for the mortgagor's non-business related debt.
A. De-acceleration of Home Mortgage
Often the only or, in any event, the most significant real estate mortgagee
in a Chapter 13 proceeding is the holder of a mortgage on the debtor's
home.109 While section 1322(b)(2) provides that the plan may, under certain
102. H.R. REP. No. 595, 95th Cong., 2d Sess. 118, reprinted in 1978 U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 5963, 6079.
103. See 11 U.S.C. § 1328 (1982); see Comment, Home Foreclosures Under
Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, 30 UCLA L. REV. 637, 643-46 (1983).
104. See 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(1) (1982).
105. See I1 U.S.C. § 362 (1982).
106. See 11 U.S.C. § 1301 (1982).
107. See 11 U.S.C. § 1301(a)(1) (1982).
108. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(7) (1982).
109. See, e.g., Comment, supra note 103, at 646.
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circumstances, "modify the rights of holders of secured claims,"110 it prohibits
such modification as to any holder of a "claim secured only by a security inter-
est in real property that is the debtor's principal residence." '' As one court
has noted, this latter exception "was in response to perceptions, or to sugges-
tions advanced in the legislative hearings . . . that home-mortgagor lenders,
performing a valuable social service through their loans, needed special protec-
tion against modification. 11' 2 Yet section 1322(b) also contains important
cross-current provisions. Section 1322(b)(3) provides for the "curing or waiv-
ing of any default." 113 Moreover, section 1322(b)(5) specifies that "notwith-
standing [section 1322(b)(2)]" the plan may "provide for the curing of any
default within a reasonable time and maintenance of payments while the case
is pending on any . . . secured claim on which the last payment is due after
the date on which the final payment under the plan is due.""
14
Attempts to reconcile the foregoing provisions have proved extremely dif-
ficult when debtors attempt to utilize the "cure" language to defeat a mort-
gage acceleration that has occurred prior to a Chapter 13 filing. Mortgagees
argue that to permit "de-acceleration" under such circumstances would
amount to an impermissible modification under section 1322(b)(2). Under this
reasoning section 1322(b)(3) is read literally to be inapplicable to a home
mortgage debt." 5 Consequently, a default on such a mortgage is curable, if at
all, under section 1322(b)(5) and then only if "the last payment is due after
the date on which the final payment under the plan is due.""" As one federal
Court of Appeals remarked,
if so read,--and if the term 'on which the last payment is due' is given its
state law meaning as to an accelerated debt that thereby becomes fully 'due'
. . . it would thus bar-whenever the home mortgage debt had been acceler-
ated prior to a debtor's petition-any Chapter 13 relief by which the debtor
could save his home by paying past-due amounts on his home-mortgage
through periodic payments under the term of his Chapter 13 plan."'
Indeed, several bankruptcy court decisions take such a restrictive approach to
the right to cure."18
110. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(2) (1982).
111. Id.
112. Grubbs v. Houston First Am. Sav. Assoc., 730 F.2d 236, 246 (5th Cir.
1984).
113. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(3) (1982).
114. See 11 U.S.C. § 1322(b)(5) (1982).
115. Grubbs v. Houston First Am. Say. Assoc., 730 F.2d 236, 241 n.8 (5th Cir.
1984).
116. Id.
117. Id. at 241.
118. See, e.g., In re Britton, 35 Bankr. 373 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1982); In re Wil-
liams, 11 Bankr. 504 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1981); In re LaPaglia, 8 Bankr. 937 (Bankr.
E.D.N.Y. 1981); In re Soderlund, 18 Bankr. 12 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1981); In re Allen,
17 Bankr. 119 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981), rev'd, 42 Bankr. 360 (N.D. Ohio 1984).
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The foregoing approach was rejected in In re Taddeo,119 a leading deci-
sion by the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit. In that
case, the debtors were permitted, pursuant to their Chapter 13 plan, to defeat
a pre-petition mortgage acceleration by payment of arrearages and to reinstate
the mortgage's original amortization schedule. Not only did the court hold
that the "concept of 'cure' in section 1322(b)(5) contains the power to de-
accelerate," 120 but also that "the ban on 'modification' in section 1322(b)(2)
does not limit the [debtors'] exercise of their curative powers under either sec-
tion 1322(b)(3) or (b)(5)."1 21 Consequently, the debtors were permitted to
cure their default under (b)(3) and thereafter maintain their payments pursu-
ant to (b)(5). In buttressing its conclusion, the Second Circuit not only re-
jected the argument that (b)(3) was inapplicable to home mortgages, 2 2 it
emphasized:
First, we think that the power to cure must comprehend the power to
"de-accelerate." This follows from the concept of "curing a default." A de-
fault is an event in the debtor-creditor relationship which triggers certain con-
sequences-here, acceleration. Curing a default commonly means taking care
of the triggering event and returning to pre-default conditions. The conse-
quences are thus nullified. This is the concept of "cure" used throughout the
Bankruptcy Code . . . . Secondly, we believe that the power to "cure any
default" granted in § 1322(b)(3) and (b)(5) is not limited by the ban against
"modifying" home mortgages in § 1322(b)(2) because we do not read "curing
defaults" under (b)(3) or "curing defaults and maintaining payments" under
(b)(5) to be modifications of claims.1 23
Moreover, Taddeo rejected the contention that state law governs the effect of
acceleration and the debtor's ability to cure a default.12' Rather, it concluded
that, by enacting section 1322(b), Congress intended to permit cure in bank-
ruptcy proceedings. The court did "not believe that Congress labored for five
years over this controversial question only to remit consumer debt-
ors-intended to be primary beneficiaries of the new Code-to the harsher
mercies of state law.' 25
Taddeo is supported by important policy considerations. As the Taddeo
court itself stressed, "conditioning a debtor's right to cure on its having filed a
Chapter 13 petition prior to acceleration would prompt unseemly and wasteful
races to the courthouse. Worse, these would be races in which mortgagees
possess an unwarranted and likely insurmountable advantage: wage earners
seldom will possess the sophistication in bankruptcy matters that financial in-
119. 685 F.2d 24 (2d Cir. 1982). For an excellent analysis of Taddeo, see Za-
retsky, Some Limits on Mortgagees Rights in Chapter 13, 50 BROOKLYN L. REV. 433
(1984).
120. In re Taddeo, 685 F.2d at 28.
121. Id.
122. Id. at 27.
123. Id. at 26-27.
124. Id. at 28.
125. Id. at 25.
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stitutions do, and often will not have retained counsel in time for counsel to do
much good.' 26 Moreover, even assuming a relatively high level of debtor so-
phistication, an anti-Taddeo approach may well encourage premature bank-
ruptcy petitions rather than debtor attempts to resolve their financial problems
by negotiation, mediation, or other extrajudicial means. 1 7 In addition, a "re-
fusal to permit de-acceleration .. .would probably . ..encourage mortga-
gees to declare defaults and accelerate earlier to avoid the necessity of dealing
with a Chapter 13 debtor."' 2 At a practical level, to the extent that a rejec-
tion of Taddeo results in foreclosure and forces the debtor to find other shel-
ter, many Chapter 13 plans may well be jeopardized. More important, because
the family residence is frequently the debtor's major asset and Chapter 13 is
often utilized to protect it, an anti-Taddeo approach would substantially dis-
courage Chapter 13 usage, a result which Congress, given its preference for
debtor rehabilitation over liquidation, could hardly have intended.
Subsequent decisions by the federal courts of appeal and most bankruptcy
courts have endorsed the Taddeo rationale."2 9 So too has substantial scholarly
commentary.130 This does not mean, however, that Taddeo affords an open-
ended right to de-accelerate all home mortgage loans in default irrespective of
their terms. Suppose, for example, that the total principal balance of a home
mortgage debt becomes due, not as the result of acceleration based on mortga-
gor failure to make timely installment payments, but rather because the terms
of the loan called for a final "balloon" payment which mortgagor failed to
pay. It is unlikely that such a mortgagor will be able to use Taddeo and its
progeny to de-accelerate the balloon in order to pay it off on an installment
126. Id. at 27.
127. Zaretsky, supra, note 119, at 443.
128. Id. at 443.
129. See In re Clark, 738 F.2d 869 (7th Cir. 1984); Grubbs v. Houston First
Am. Say. Assoc., 730 F.2d 236 (5th Cir. 1984); In re Parker, 46 Bankr. 106 (Bankr.
N.D. Ga. 1985); In re Fisher, 35 Bankr. 678 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1983); In re Christian,
35 Bankr. 229 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1983); In re Frey, 34 Bankr. 607 (Bankr. M.D. Pa.
1983); In re Hardin, 16 Bankr. 810 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1982); In re Smith, 19 Bankr.
592, 593 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1982); In re Gooden, 21 Bankr. 456, 458 (Bankr. N.D. Ga.
1982); In re Kokkinis, 22 Bankr. 353 (Bankr. N.D. I11. 982); In re Young, 22 Bankr.
620 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1982); In re Evans, 22 Bankr. 980 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1982), aff'd,
30 Bankr. 530 (9th Cir. 1983); In re Briggs, 25 Bankr. 317 (D.N.D. 1982); In re
Acevedo, 26 Bankr. 994 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); In re Rippe, 14 Bankr. 367 (Bankr. S.D.
Fla. 1981; In re Davis, 15 Bankr. 22 (Bankr. D. Kan.), affd, 16 Bankr. 473 (D. Kan.
1981).
130. Zaretsky, supra note 119; Sable, A Chapter 13 Debtor's Right to Cure De-
fault Under Section 1322(b): A Problem of Interpretation, 57 AM. BANKR. L.J. 127,
139-40 (1983); Comment, supra note 103, at 658-65; Comment, Chapter 13 Bank-
ruptcy: When May a Mortgage Debtor Cure the Accelerated Mortgage Debt Using
Section 1322(b)(5)?, 8 U. DAYTON L. REV. 109, 121-25 (1982); Note, Bank-
ruptcy-Mortgages-Despite Pre-Bankruptcy Acceleration of a Mortgage Under
State Law, A Debtor Can Cure Default and Reinstate the Original Payment Schedule
Under Chapter 13 of the Bankruptcy Code.-In re Taddeo, 685 F.2d 24 (2d Cir.
1982), 52 U. CIN. L. REv. 196, 206-07 (1983).
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basis. Indeed, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held
in this connection that to permit "de-acceleration" under such circumstances
would constitute an impermissible "modification" under section 1322(b)(2). 13 1
According to the court,
[w]hen a debt has been accelerated, 'cure' therefore results in the reinstate-
ment of the original payment terms of the debt. But when a debt has already
matured, . . . 'cure' . . . cannot aid the debtor, since reinstatement of the
original terms of the debt will merely make the debt immediately due and
payable. 32
While the foregoing approach clearly burdens many homeowners who, because
of "creative financing" techniques agree to balloon payments and find them-
selves unable to refinance them, it clearly is correct. It is one thing to de-
accelerate a loan where the parties contemplated that it would be fully amor-
tized by installment payments and quite another to do so where the balloon
payment was an essential and bargained for element of the transaction.
Substantial differences remain as to when in the foreclosure process the
Taddeo de-acceleration right should be cut off. Several cases suggest that de-
acceleration should not be permitted after a foreclosure judgment has been
entered. 133 Such decisions reflect a concern for protecting the finality of state
court judgments and the avoidance of undue mortgage market uncertainty.
Other cases, on the other hand, have permitted post-judgment de-accelera-
tion."14 The latter approach seems preferable. A foreclosure judgment only
confirms that the entire debt is now due and owing and that the mortgagee
may sell the property, although the debtor is still in possesion. Despite the
mortgagee's efforts in obtaining the judgment, the debtor should be able to de-
accelerate, especially since his residence is involved. In any event, the mort-
gage agreement will often allow the mortgagee to recover both the expenses of
foreclosure and a subsequent judgment.23 6
To what extent should Taddeo de-acceleration be permitted after the
foreclosure sale? The answer in large measure should depend on how "final"
the foreclosure sale is under state law. For example, when the sale divests the
mortgagor of all interest in the real estate, the debtor should not be allowed to
131. In re Seidel, 752 F.2d 1382 (9th Cir. 1985).
132. Id. at 1386.
133. In re White, 22 Bankr. 542 (Bankr. D. Del. 1982); In re Anderson, 16
Bankr. 697 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982); In re Jenkins, 14 Bankr. 748 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1981); In re Land, 14 Bankr. 132 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 1981); In re Davis, 15 Bankr. 22
(Bankr. D. Kan. 1981), affid, 16 Bankr. 473 (D. Kan. 1981); In re Wilson, 11 Bankr.
986 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1981); In re Pearson, 10 Bankr. 189 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1981).
134. In re Clark, 738 F.2d 869 (7th Cir. 1984); In re Tuchman, 29 Bankr. 39
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 1983); In re McCann, 27 Bankr. 678 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1982); In re
McSorley, 24 Bankr. 795 (Bankr. D.N.J. 1982); In re Hubbard, 23 Bankr. 671 (Bankr.
S.D. Ohio 1982); In re Acevedo, 26 Bankr. 994 (E.D.N.Y. 1982); In re Young, 22
Bankr. 620 (Bankr. N.D. II1. 1982); In re Taylor, 21 Bankr. 179 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
1982); In re Smith, 19 Bankr. 592 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1982).
135. Zaretsky, supra note 119, at 447.
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restore the original payment schedule. A purchaser has no expectation of los-
ing the property, and the debtor's interest should thus be permanently termi-
nated.136 On the other hand, about half the states have post-sale redemption
statutes, under which the mortgagor and, in many cases, junior lienholders,
have the right to redeem the foreclosed real estate for a specified period of
time by paying the foreclosure sale purchaser the sale price.'37 Thus, the inter-
est in finality is less compelling in a Taddeo sense because the foreclosure title
is already defeasible. Indeed, several courts have applied the Taddeo concept
in such situations. 138
It may, however, be unwise to apply Taddeo in such contexts without
drawing a further distinction between the mortgagee and a third party as fore-
closure sale purchasers. When a mortgagor redeems under statutory redemp-
tion, as the foregoing indicates, she typically pays the foreclosure purchaser
the foreclosure sale price in a lump sum. On the other hand, in post-sale de-
acceleration, the goal of the mortgagor is simply to satisfy mortgage arrear-
ages and to restore the original amortization schedule. If the mortgagee is the
foreclosure sale purchaser, there should be no significant difference between a
pre- and post-foreclosure de-acceleration. Any additional expenses incurred by
the mortgagee will presumably be added to the mortgage balance."39 Indeed,
in many statutory redemption states the mortgagor retains the right to posses-
sion during the statutory period and, in those jurisdictions, de-acceleration will
have no effect on possession.' 40 On the other hand, when a third party
purchases at the foreclosure sale, he relies on the fact that if the property is
redeemed, he will receive a refund of the purchase price in a lump sum. Con-
sequently, it seems especially inequitable to force him to accept redemption by
installment under a Chapter 13 plan.""
Missouri mortgagors, however, will find only limited comfort in Taddeo
as a post-foreclosure remedy. Unlike under most state statutory redemption
systems, a Missouri mortgagor has no redemption rights unless the mortgagee
is the foreclosure sale purchaser. 42 Consequently, if a third party purchases at
an otherwise valid sale, the latter's title is non-defeasible and Taddeo thus
should be inapplicable.
136. Id. at 448; accord In re Smith, 43 Bankr. 313 (Bankr. N.D. I11. 1984); In re
Cretella, 42 Bankr. 526 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1984); In re Nimai Kumar Ghosh, 38
Bankr. 600 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1984); In re Wallace, 31 Bankr. 64 (Bankr. Md. 1983).
137. See G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, REAL ESTATE FINANCE LAW § 8.4 (2d Ed.
1985).
138. See In re Ivory, 32 Bankr. 788 (Bankr. D. Or. 1983); In re Chambers, 27
Bankr. 687 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1983); In re Kokkinis, 22 Bankr. 353 (Bankr. N.D. Ill.
1982); In re Gooden, 21 Bankr. 456 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1982); In re Thompson, 17
Bankr. 748 (Bankr. W.D. Mich. 1982).
139. Zaretsky, supra note 119, at 448.
140. See G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 137, at §§ 8.4-8.6.
141. Zaretsky, supra note 119, at 450.
142. Mo. REV. STAT. § 443.410 (1978); Comment, Statutory Redemption Fol-
lowing Power of Sale Foreclosure in Missouri, 47 Mo. L. REV. 309, 314 (1982).
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Even where the mortgagee is the sale purchaser, the mortgagor's redemp-
tion rights are not triggered unless at the sale or within ten days before it he
gives the trustee written notice of an intent to redeem. 143 Moreover, he must
also post a redemption bond within twenty days after the sale in an amount
and in a form approved by the circuit court in the county where the land is
located.144 If the foregoing requirements are satisfied, the mortgagor has a one
year period in which to redeem by payment to the mortgagee of an amount
equal to the mortgage debt plus costs of sale and other additional sums.' 45
Clearly, if the mortgagor fails to satisfy the pre-sale notification requirement,
no statutory right survives the sale and, accordingly, neither should a Taddeo
claim. 46 On the other hand, if the requisite notice is given and the bond is
approved, the one year period is triggered and based on the reasoning of the
earlier paragraphs in this subsection, a mortgagor who files a Chapter 13 pro-
ceeding during that period should be able to utilize a Taddeo de-acceleration
to set aside the foreclosure sale. Moreover, even if the filing of the Chapter 13
proceeding occurs after the foreclosure sale but prior to the posting of the
bond, since the mortgagor's statutory rights are still alive, an assertion of a
Taddeo claim during that period may well be successful even though the bond
is not ultimately approved.
B. Relief from a Chapter 13 Stay
As noted earlier, section 362(d) of the Act authorizes relief from the stay
"(1) for cause, including the lack of adequate protection of an interest in prop-
erty of [the mortgagor]; or (2) .. .if (A) the [mortgagor] does not have an
equity in such property; and (B) such property is not necessary to an effective
reorganization." 47 However, there has been substantial disagreement about
whether (d)(2), as well as (d)(1), is applicable in Chapter 13 proceedings. 41
There is significant case law that it is and that a mortgagee is entitled to stay
relief under either subsection. 49 Indeed, section 103 of the Act expressly
states that Chapter 3, which includes section 362, is applicable to Chapter
13.150 On the other hand, there is substantial case authority to the contrary15'
143. Mo. REv. STAT. § 443.410 (1978).
144. Mo. REV. STAT. § 443.420 (1978).
145. Id.
146. See In re Taylor, Civ. Action No. 82-00559-CV-W (W.D. Mo. 1982), an
unpublished federal district court opinion reversing 21 Bankr. 179 (Bankr. W.D. Mo.
1981). The latter opinion had utilized § 1322(b)(5) to set aside a foreclosure sale even
though the mortgagor had failed to provide the notice required by Mo. REv. STAT. §
443.410 (1978).
147. See 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (1982); see also text accompanying notes 38-39,
supra.
148. See Comment, supra note 103 at 646-47, 660-61.
149. See, e.g., In re Crouse, 9 Bankr. 400 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1981); First Conn.
Small Business Inv. Co. v. Ruark, 7 Bankr. 46 (Bankr. D.C. Conn. 1980); In re
Zellmer, 6 Bankr. 497 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1980).
150. See 11 U.S.C. § 103(a) (1982).
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and a supporting textual argument as well. Since section 362(d)(2) refers to a
"reorganization," it has been asserted that it is applicable only to Chapter 11,
which is entitled "Reorganization," and not to Chapter 13 because the latter
chapter is entitled "Adjustment of Debts of an Individual with Regular In-
come."' 52 Moreover, a convincing policy argument may be made for the latter
position.15 3 According to one recent bankruptcy decision,
If subsection (d)(2) applies, a debtor [who has] no equity in property which is
not necessary to consumate a chapter 13 plan could, through lift-stay actions,
be involuntarily dispossessed of such property; the purpose, however, of chap-
ter 13 is to enable individual debtors with regular incomes to develop and
perform a plan for the repayment of debts over an extended period of
time. . . .The emphasis is on providing individuals with regular incomes an
alternative to liquidation. . . .Hence, it is the ability of the individual debt-
ors to furnish the creditor with the value of his interest [in the form of prop-
erty or from current earnings], which is the key to the protection of the chap-
ter 13 creditor. . . .Whether the [property] being retained by the debtor is
necessary to the subsistence or rehabilitation of the debtor, or whether the
debtor has any equity in [it] are not factors of concern [applicable or rele-
vant] to Chapter 13 proceedings.'"
In any event, stay relief after the confirmation of a Chapter 13 plan becomes
much more problematical. However the foregoing section 362 question is ulti-
mately resolved, once the plan becomes effective, bankruptcy courts will be
reluctant to risk its failure by permitting foreclosure of the debtor's residence.
Indeed, case law suggests that only significant debtor default under the plan
will justify a dissolution of the stay.155
V. SETTING ASIDE PRE-BANKRUPTCY FORECLOSURES
Traditionally, foreclosure sale purchasers have had relatively little to fear
from subsequent mortgagor bankruptcy. Unless it could be established that
the foreclosure violated state law or that the mortgage itself was avoidable,
foreclosures were relatively secure from bankruptcy attack. To be sure, in ju-
risdictions that utilize statutory redemption, 15 a trustee in bankruptcy has the
right to exercise the mortgagor-debtor's redemption rights. 5 ' However, the
bankruptcy court probably does not have general equitable authority to stay
151. See, e.g., In re Rhoades, 34 Bankr. 168 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1983); In re Feim-
ster, 3 Bankr. 11 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1979); see also In re Sulzer, 2 Bankr. 630 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 1980); In re Youngs, 7 Bankr. 69 (Bankr. D.C. Mass. 1980).
152. Comment, supra note 103 at 648.
153. See In re Rhodes, 34 Bankr. 168, 171 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1983); Comment,
supra note 103 at 661.
154. In re Rhodes, 34 Bankr. 168, 171 (Bankr. D. Vt. 1983).
155. See, e.g, In re Pizzullo, 33 Bankr. 740 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1983); In re Evans,
22 Bankr. 980 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. 1982).
156. See G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 137, §§ 8.4-8.7.
157. See supra notes 150-52 and authorities cited therein.
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the running of the redemption period.1 58 Moreover, under the weight of au-
thority, the automatic stay does not operate to toll the running of such peri-
ods. 159 The trustee may, however, pursuant to section 108(b) of the Bank-
ruptcy Code redeem within the later of the expiration of the redemption
period or sixty days after the filing of the bankruptcy petition. 60
However troublesome the foregoing redemption rights may be for mortga-
gees and other foreclosure purchasers, they do not threaten the validity of pre-
bankruptcy foreclosure sales. Recent developments, however, have eroded
much of the traditional protection afforded such foreclosures. We have already
explored in the preceding section how the Taddeo concept may be used in
certain Chapter 13 contexts to de-accelerate previously foreclosed mortgage
debts.1 61 In addition, an increasing number of courts are utilizing the fraudu-
lent conveyance provisions of the Bankruptcy Code to set aside pre-bankruptcy
foreclosures. Moreover, to a much more limited extent, such foreclosures have
been subjected to successful attack as voidable preferences. These latter two
developments are explored in detail in this section.
A. The Foreclosure Sale as a Fraudulent Conveyance
1. The Durrett Problem
Under section 548(a) of the Bankruptcy Act not only may a trustee set
aside a transfer by a debtor within a year of bankruptcy that was intended to
defraud, hinder, or delay present or future creditors, she may also avoid such a
transfer, irrespective of debtor intent, if the debtor "received less than a rea-
158. See In re Martinson, 731 F.2d 543 (8th Cir. 1984); Johnson v. First Nat'l
Bank, 719 F.2d 270 (8th Cir. 1983); In re Lally, 38 Bankr. 622 (Bankr. D. Iowa); In
re Martinson, 26 Bankr. 648 (D.C.N.D. 1983); In re Owens, 27 Bankr. 946 (Bankr.
E.D. Mich. 1983).
159. See Johnson v. First Nat'l Bank, 719 F.2d 270 (8th Cir. 1983); Bank of
Commonwealth v. Bevan, 13 Bankr. 989 (E.D. Mich. 1981); In re Owens, 27 Bankr.
946 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983); In re Cucumber Creek Dev., 33 Bankr. 820 (D. Colo.
1983). Contra In re Smith, 43 Bankr. 313 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. 1984); In re Shea Realty,
Inc., 21 Bankr. 790 (Bankr. Vt. 1982).
160. See In re Owens, 27 Bankr. 946 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. 1983); In re Cucumber
Creek Dev., Inc., 33 Bankr. 820 (D. Colo. 1983). Section 108(b) provides as follows:
(b) Except as provided in subsection (a) of this section, if applicable law, an
order entered in a proceeding, or an agreement fixes a period within which the
debtor or an individual protected under section 1301 of this title may file any
pleading, demand, notice, or proof of claim or loss, cure a default, or perform
any other similar act, and such period has not expired before the date of the
filing of the petition, the trustee may only file, cure, or perform, as the case
may be, before the later of-
(1) the end of such period, including any suspension of such period oc-
curring on or after the commencement of the case; and
(2) 60 days after the order for relief.
II U.S.C. § 108(b) (1982).
161. See supra IV(A).
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sonably equivalent value in exchange for such transfer. . and was insolvent
on the date that such transfer was made." 16 2 Durrett v. Washington National
Insurance Co.,163 a 1980 Fifth Circuit decision under the predecessor to sec-
tion 548(a), marked the first time that a court used the fraudulent conveyance
concept to invalidate a non-collusive foreclosure sale that was otherwise valid
under state law.16 4 In that case, a trustee under a Texas deed of trust sold the
mortgaged real estate having a fair market value of $200,000 to a third party
purchaser for $115,400. Nine days later Durrett, the mortgagor, filed a peti-
tion for reorganization under the predecessor to Chapter 11 and, in his capac-
ity as debtor-in-possession, sought to set aside the foreclosure as a fraudulent
conveyance. The district court held that the foreclosure sale constituted a
transfer by the debtor, but denied Durrett's request on the ground that the
sale produced "a fair equivalent" of the value of the real estate. The court of
appeals agreed that a transfer had taken place, but reversed the district court
on the consideration issue. The court acknowledged that two transfers had
taken place-the first, when the deed of trust was executed eight years earlier
and which was no longer vulnerable, and a second, when the foreclosure sale
took place. The latter qualified as a transfer because, under Texas law, it
passed to the purchaser the debtor-mortgagor's right to possession. Moreover,
it clearly fell within the statutory period. As to the consideration issue, the
court suggested that a foreclosure price of less than seventy percent of the
property's fair market value failed to meet the "fair equivalency" test under
the then existing statute.
Durrett has been followed in numerous section 548(a) cases, including In
re Hulm,'65 a decision by the Eighth Circuit. It has been applied to judicial
foreclosures, 66 strict foreclosures,' 6 7 and a variety of power of sale and other
non-judicial contexts.'6 8 The decisions involve reorganizations under Chapters
162. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 548(a)(2)(A), 548(a)(2)(B)(i) (1982). A debtor is "insol-
vent" if its debts are greater than its assets, at a fair valuation, exclusive of property
exempted or transferred with actual fraudulent intent. In re Wheeler, 34 Bankr. 818,
822 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1983); see 11 U.S.C. § 101(29) (1982).
163. 621 F.2d 201 (5th Cir. 1980).
164. Several pre-Durrett cases concluded that a noncollusive foreclosure sale that
yields less than fair market value was not a fraudulent conveyance. See Merriam v.
Winpfheimer, 25 F. Supp. 405 (S.D.N.Y. 1938); Pierce v. Pierce, 16 Cal. App. 375,
117 P. 580 (1911).
165. 738 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1984); see infra notes 166-72 and cases cited
therein. But see In re Winshall Settlor's Trust, 758 F.2d 1136 (6th Cir. 1985).
166. See In re Hulm, 738 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1984); In re Dudley, 38 Bankr. 666
(Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1984); In re Jones, 20 Bankr. 988 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1982).
167. See In re Carr, 34 Bankr. 653 (Bankr. D. Conn. 1983); In re Berge, 33
Bankr. 642 (W.D. Wis. 1983); In re Perdido Bay Country Club Estates, 23 Bankr. 36
(Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1982) (applying Vermont law).
168. See In re Wheeler, 34 Bankr. 818 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1983); In re Smith, 24
Bankr. 19 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1982); In re Richardson, 23 Bankr. 434 (Bankr. D. Utah
1982); In re Thompson, 18 Bankr. 67 (Bankr. E.D. Tenn. 1982); In re Marshall, 15
Bankr. 738 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1981).
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11169 and 13170 as well as liquidations under Chapter 7.171 Moreover, the "70%
rule of thumb" is being increasingly institutionalized. 7 2
2. Cases Rejecting Durrett
Two significant cases, each using a different rationale, reject the Durrett
approach. The first, In re Alsop,'"7 involved a power of sale foreclosure under
a deed of trust that occurred two days prior to the filing of a Chapter 11
petition. The debtor-in-possession sought to avoid the foreclosure as a fraudu-
lent transfer. The Bankruptcy Court for the District of Alaska rejected Dur-
rett by applying a "relation back" analysis. While the Alsop court conceded
that a transfer occurred at the time of the foreclosure sale, it stressed that
section 548(d)(1) of the Act also needed to be considered.17 4 Under this latter
provision, a transfer is deemed to take place when "such transfer becomes so
far perfected that a bona fide purchaser from the debtor against whom such
transfer could have been perfected cannot acquire an interest in the property
transferred that is superior to the interest in such property of the trans-
feree. 1 7 5 In applying the foregoing section, the Alsop court concluded that
[s]ince under Alaska law no purchaser from [mortgagors] subsequent to
[mortgagors'] execution of the deed of trust and its recordation on November
8, 1978, could have acquired an interest superior to that of the transferee at
the foreclosure sale, pursuant to the provisions of § 548(d)(1) the transfer was
made as of November 8, 1978. Since this date is outside the one year period
established by § 548(a), the foreclosure sale is not avoidable as a fraudulent
transfer.17 6
Alsop seems to misinterpret section 548(d)(1). As noted earlier, a sepa-
rate transfer occurs at the time of the execution of the deed of trust and, later,
at the time of the foreclosure sale. 7 7 The purpose of section 548(d)(1) in each
169. See, e.g., In re Frank, 39 Bankr. 166 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. 1984); In re Berge,
33 Bankr. 642 (Bankr. W.D. Wis. 1983).
170. See, e.g., In re Dudley, 38 Bankr. 666 (Bankr. M.D. Pa. 1984); In re
Wheeler, 34 Bankr. 818 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1983); In re Worcester, 28 Bankr. 910
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1983).
171. See, e.g., In re Richard, 26 Bankr. 560 (Bankr. D.R.I 1983); In re Smith,
24 Bankr. 19 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. 1982); In re Richardson, 23 Bankr. 434 (Bankr. D.
Utah 1982).
172. See supra notes 10-16 and cases cited therein; see also In re Hulm, 45
Bankr. 523 (Bankr. D.N.D. 1984).
173. 14 Bankr. 982 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1981), affd, 22 Bankr. 1017 (D. Alaska
1982).
174. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(1) (1982).
175. Id.
176. In re Alsop, 14 Bankr. 982, 986 (Bankr. D. Alaska 1981), affid 22 Bankr.
1017 (D. Alaska 1982).
177. See infra text accompanying note 156. For the view that foreclosure is not a
separate transfer, see Coppel & Kahn, Defanging Durrett: The Established Law of
Transfer, 100 BANKING L.J. 676 (1983).
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context is to encourage prompt recording of the transfer instrument rather
than to cause a separate and distinct transfer to relate back to an earlier
one. 17 8 As Professor Henning has stressed:
Foreclosure of the deed of trust involves an involuntary conveyance of the
debtor's remaining interest in the property except for a statutory right of re-
demption in those states that grant such a right. This involuntary conveyance
constitutes a separate transfer. The most important rights affected by this
second transfer are the right to possession and the debtor's equity in the prop-
erty, neither of which were conveyed under the deed of trust. When a pur-
chaser buys at the foreclosure sale, the deed of trust ordinarily will be consid-
ered discharged; if the purchaser fails to record the trustee's deed, however,
he will be protected against subsequent bona fide purchasers from the original
debtor. Thus, recordation of the trustee's deed serves a different purpose than
recordation of the original deed of trust because it protects a different set of
rights. In this context, section 548(d)(1) refers to perfection of the interests
acquired at the foreclosure sale, the second transfer, and not to perfection of
the interests conveyed by the deed of trust, the first transfer. If the purchaser
delays in perfecting his interest, the second transfer, like the first, can be
brought forward into the avoidance period. 17
According to Professor Henning, the "relation back" notion simply restates
the principle that the purchaser takes free of any interests junior to the inter-
est being foreclosed. Professor Henning argues however that this principle
"does not provide a satisfactory basis for fusing the two transfers for purposes
of section 548(d)(1). [The latter section] should be applied strictly as a mech-
anism for bringing a transfer . . . forward into the avoidance period." 80
The second major anti-Durrett case is In re Madrid,28 ' a decision of the
Ninth- Circuit. In that case, the bankruptcy court set aside a power of sale
foreclosure in a Chapter 11 context that yielded 67% of the real estate's fair
market value.282 The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, in reversing, did not deal
with the transfer issue, but instead "constru[ed] the reasonably equivalent
value requirement of § 548(a)(2) to mean the same as the consideration re-
ceived at a non-collusive and regularly conducted foreclosure sale."' 83 The
court of appeals affirmed, but its reasoning differed from that used by the
bankruptcy appellate panel and Alsop as well. The court of appeals eschewed
the "relation back" approach even though the deed of trust had been recorded
more than a year before the filing of the Chapter 11 petition. Rather, the
court concluded that section 548(a)(2) was simply not intended to apply to
178. See Henning, supra note 100, at 267-68.
179. Id. at 268-69.
180. Id. at 269-70; see also Alden, Gross & Horowitz, Real Property Foreclo-
sure as a Fraudulent Conveyance: Proposals for Solving the Durrett Problem, 38 Bus.
LAW 1605, 1609-11 (1983).
181. 725 F.2d 1197 (9th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 125 (1984); see also
In re Winshall Settlor's Trust, 758 F.2d 1136 (6th Cir. 1985).
182. In re Madrid, 10 Bankr. 795 (Bankr. D. Nev. 1981).
183. In re Madrid, 21 Bankr. 424, 427 (9th Cir. 1982).
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foreclosure sales under a valid lien. The latter section and its antecedents, ac-
cording to the court, instead "provide authority for the proposition that con-
veyances are set aside when there is actual fraud or a situation indicative of
fraud. 1814
The court of appeals' reasoning in Madrid has been called into question
by a provision of the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of
1984 which amended the Bankruptcy Act's general definition of transfer to
include "foreclosure of the debtor's equity of redemption." 1815 Post-enactment
senatorial statements indicate that the amendment was "not intended to have
any effect one way or the other on the. . .Durrett issue" or on Madrid.18 On
the other hand, Professor Henning has concluded that while "it is unclear
whether [the amendment] signifies congressional approval of Durrett," it
"probably overrules Madrid.' 87 Whether one agrees with the latter assess-
ment or not, the literal language of the amendment certainly emphasizes that
a foreclosure sale can constitute a transfer and, at the very least, seriously
undercuts the court of appeals' reasoning in Madrid that section 548(a) sim-
ply does not encompass foreclosure under valid liens.
3. Impact of Durrett
If Durrett ultimately prevails nationally, it in effect will create, de facto,
in every state a one year statutory redemption system. 88 For those states that
currently do not have a statutory redemption scheme, the impact of Durrett is
dramatic. 189 However, its effect in most statutory redemption states will also
be significant. This is because Durrett is broader in scope than most state re-
demption statutes. First, the one year period is longer than under some state
statutes.18 0 Second, while state legislation typically confers redemption rights
on mortgagors and, in some instances, on junior lienholders,' 9' rights conferred
by Durrett benefit unsecured creditors as well. Third, a party who redeemed
under statutory redemption usually must tender to the foreclosure purchaser
the amount of the purchase price.192 Durrett, on the other hand, imposes no
such cost; rather, the purchaser ultimately will be reimbursed out of the pro-
ceeds of a bankruptcy resale.193
184. 725 F.2d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1984).
185. See 11 U.S.C. § 101(48) (1982) (adopted as the Bankruptcy Amendments
and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, § 421 (i), Pub. L. No. 98-353, 98 Stat. 333, 368).
186. 130 CONG. REc. S13771-13772 (daily ed. Oct. 5, 1984) (statements by Sen-
ators DeConcini and Dole).
187. Henning, supra note 100, at 271 n.79.
188. Id. at 265.
189. Almost half of the states have no statutory redemption. See G. NELSON &
D. WHITMAN, supra note 137, § 8.4.
190. Id.
191. G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 137, § 8.5.
192. G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 137, § 8.4.
193. Henning, supra note 100, at 276.
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Moreover, the impact of Durrett and In re Hulm,'" its Eighth Circuit
counterpart, will be more substantial in Missouri than in most other statutory
redemption states. The Missouri redemption scheme1 95 is much more limited
than the systems utilized in other jurisdictions. As noted earlier in this article,
the statutory right can be asserted only by the mortgagor and his successors in
interest; it is unavailable to junior lienholders. 19 6 Moreover, it is triggered only
if the mortgagor posts a redemption bond and the mortgagee is a successful
foreclosure sale purchaser. 97 Consequently, while statutory redemption does
not deter third party bidding in Missouri, Durrett almost surely will.
Under certain circumstances, Durrett can create uncertainty for more
than a year. This can occur in those situations where a bankruptcy petition is,
in fact, filed within a year of the foreclosure sale. Because a section 548 avoid-
ance action "can be brought until the earlier of two years after the appoint-
ment of a trustee or the time the case is closed or dismissed, the period of
uncertainty for the purchaser can exceed three years."' 98 A Chapter 11 trus-
tee, as noted earlier, 99 may never be appointed and, under such circum-
stances, the debtor-in-possession could in theory pursue a Durrett action at
any time during the reorganization proceeding. 90 0 Moreover, even in a Chapter
7 liquidation, there can be considerable delay in the appointment of a
trustee.20 1
What is the impact on a foreclosure sale purchaser of a successful avoid-
ance under Durrett? Any good faith purchaser for value obtains a lien on the
real estate to the extent of value given.2 2 This lien will also include the value
of post-purchase improvements to the real estate.'03 Moreover, interest is prob-
ably recoverable at either the mortgage rate or a market rate.204 It should be
remembered that a Chapter 7 trustee will be seeking to enhance the value of
194. 738 F.2d 323 (8th Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 398 (1984).
195. Mo. REV. STAT. § 443.410 (1978),
196. Id.; see supra text accompanying notes 138-46. Comment, Statutory Re-
demption Following Power of Sale Foreclosure in Missouri, 47 Mo. L. REV. 309, 316-
20 (1982).
197. Mo. REV. STAT. § 443.410 (1978); Comment, supra note 196, at 314-15.
198. Henning, supra note 100, at 265. On the other hand, the one year period
probably runs from the foreclosure sale date, and not from the date that any statutory
redemption period expires. See In re Kangas, 46 Bankr. 102 (Bankr. Minn. 1985).
199. See supra text accompanying notes 32-37.
200. Henning, supra note 100, at 265-66.
201. Id. at 266.
202. See 11 U.S.C. § 548(c) (1982); Henning, supra note 100, at 279. Value
means "property, or satisfaction or securing of a present or antecedent debt of the
debtor." 11 U.S.C. § 548(d)(2) (1982). It has been suggested that in a noncollusive
regularly conducted foreclosure, good faith will not be a problem. See Henning, supra
note 100, at 279 n.134. But see Note, Nonjudicial Foreclosure under Deed of Trust
May Be a Fraudulent Transfer of Bankrupt's Property, 47 Mo. L. REV. 345, 351 n.55
(1982).
203. See 11 U.S.C. § 550(d)(1) (1982); Henning, supra note 100, at 279 n.137.
204. Henning, supra note 100, at 280.
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the debtor's estate by attempting to squeeze excess value out of the recaptured
real estate. Thus, she will resell the property either subject to the purchaser's
lien or free and clear of it.205 If the latter approach is utilized, the purchaser's
lien will attach to the sale proceeds.20 In the event, however, the real estate
cannot be sold for more than the lien, it should be abandoned to the
purchaser. 20 7
Proceedings under Chapters 11 and 13 pose special problems in the fore-
going regard. While a Chapter 7 trustee will utilize Durrett to recover real
estate for the purpose of prompt resale, recapture in the Chapter 11 or 13
context is typically sought to enhance the likelihood of a successful rehabilita-
tion of the debtor. Consequently, in the latter setting the real estate could be
tied up indefinitely as part of a reorganization plan. This probably does not
impose an unfair burden on the mortgagee as a foreclosure purchaser. After
all, so long as the reorganization plan affords him adequate protection, "he is
no worse off than he would have been if bankruptcy proceedings had been
commenced before foreclosure was complete."20 This is not the case, however,
where the purchaser is a third party. In effect, a Durrett recapture forces such
a purchaser to become an involuntary lender. Even if he ultimately recoups his
investment, he could be substantially prejudiced by having his funds tied up
for a substantial period of time. Under such circumstances, the bankruptcy
court should perhaps exercise its equitable discretion by compelling the trustee
or debtor-in-possession to obtain new financing for the purpose of "cashing
out" the purchaser. In any event, if Durrett ultimately prevails, the Bank-
ruptcy Act probably should be amended to permit recovery of property in re-
organization contexts only where an immediate resale or refinancing is
likely.209
4. An Evaluation of Durrett
The reaction to Durrett from the real estate bar and other real estate
interests has been uniformly hostile.210 This hostility reflects a variety of con-
cerns. It has been argued that the long period of uncertainty about foreclosure
title created by Durrett will "naturally inhibit a purchaser other than the
mortgagee from purchasing at foreclosure."2 1 Consequently, it is asserted that
205. See supra text accompanying notes 12-14.
206. Henning, supra note 100, at 279.
207. Id.
208. Id. at 283.
209. Id.
210. Groups that opposed Durrett include the American Land Title Association,
the Mortgage Brokers Institute, the American Council of Life Insurance, the American
College of Real Estate Lawyers, the California Bankers Association, and the California
Bank Clearing House Association. See Alden, Gross & Horowitz, supra note 180 at
1607 n.8.
211. Abramson v. Lakewood Bank & Trust Co., 647 F.2d 547, 549 (5th Cir.
1981) (Clark, J., dissenting).
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"by discouraging third-party buyers, [Durrett] may reduce sales prices and
increase the likelihood of deficiency judgments. It will encourage secured cred-
itors to foreclose on initial default in the hope that a quicker sale will lower
the risk that the debtor will file for bankruptcy during the following year.1211
Opposition to Durrett has been manifested in a variety of more tangible
ways. Substantial effort has been devoted to seeking its repeal by Congress. 213
Indeed, concern about Durrett is reflected in the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer
Act (UFTA), promulgated by the National Conference of Commissioners on
Uniform State Laws in 1984.214 Because of a fear that bankruptcy and state
courts would interpret state law as incorporating Durrett principles,215 the
UFTA provides that "a person gives a reasonably equivalent value if the per-
son acquires an interest of the debtor in an asset pursuant to a regularly con-
ducted, noncollusive foreclosure sale or execution of a power of sale. . . under
a mortgage, deed of trust, or security agreement. 210 The foregoing language
effectively insulates from a Durrett-type attack noncollusive foreclosures pur-
suant to any state procedure, judicial or otherwise, that entails a public sale.
While the merits of Durrett are debatable, on balance it was probably a
desirable judicial development. To be sure, any post-sale period of title defea-
sibility discourages third party bidding and, for that reason, statutory redemp-
tion systems are of doubtful utility.1 7 Moreover, to some extent Durrett com-
pounds such problems. This especially may be true in those states that
currently do not have statutory redemption. Even in those that do, Durrett, as
we have seen, may extend state redemption periods and, in other significant
ways, make foreclosure sales easier to avoid. On the other hand, Durrett's ben-
efits to unsecured creditors outweigh the foregoing concerns. As one commen-
tator has stressed, "there is no reason to permit secured creditors to reap the
benefit of assets that might have paid off unsecured creditors."21 8 This reason-
ing is sound in reorganizations as well as liquidations. Moreover, while admit-
212. Note, supra note 202 at 351. For a comprehensive criticism of Durrett, see
Zinman, Houle & Weiss, Fraudulent Transfers According to Alden, Gross &
Horowitz: A Tale of Two Circuits, 39 Bus. LAW. 977 (1984).
213. See Summary of Action of the House of Delegates, 1983 A.B.A. Proc. 1, 31
(endorsing amendment to section 548); Gold, Proposed Amendment to Clarify Status
of Property Bought in Foreclosure, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 17, 1982, at col. 1 (proposed
amendment to section 548). An unsuccessful attempt was made in 1983 to amend sec-
tion 548 to equate reasonably equivalent value with any amount paid at a good faith
foreclosure. See S. 445, 98th Cong., 1st Sess. § 360, 129 Cong. Reg. 5972 (1983). A
similar attempt in 1984 also failed.
214. See UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER AcT, 7A U.L.A. 161 (1978).
215. Section 544(b) permits the trustee to avoid any transfer that could be
avoided by an unsecured creditor under state or federal non-bankruptcy law. See 11
U.S.C. § 544(b) (1982); In re Penn Packing Co., 42 Bankr. 502 (Bankr. E.D. Pa.
1984). Thus, the American Bar Association Section of Real Property, Probate and
Trust Law urged the UFTA Drafting Committee to include anti-Durrett language.
216. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT § 3(b), 7A U.L.A. 161, 181 (1978).
217. G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 137, § 8.8.
218. Henning, supra note 100, at 276.
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tedly strong medicine, Durrett in a powerful way underscores the inadequacies
of a foreclosure system that normally fails to produce an adequate price for
foreclosed real estate.219
B. The Foreclosure Sale as a Preference
A pre-bankruptcy foreclosure may under certain circumstances be
avoided as a preference, a theory that represents a potentially important alter-
native to Durrett. Under section 547 of the Code, the trustee may avoid a
transaction if it was (1) a transfer of the debtor's property, (2) to or for the
benefit of the creditor, (3) for or on account of an antecedent debt, (4) made
while the debtor was insolvent, (5) within ninety days of bankruptcy (one year
in the case of insiders), and (6) which enables the creditor to realize more
than he would receive in a Chapter 7 liquidation.220 At least two bankruptcy
courts in Alabama and Missouri have used the foregoing section as a foreclo-
sure-avoidance tool.221 In re Wheeler,222 the Alabama decision, is illustrative
of this development. In that case, a mortgage executed eleven years earlier was
foreclosed at a public sale at which the mortgagee purchased for $15,044, the
amount of the debt and foreclosure expenses. Twenty-three days later, the
mortgagor-debtor filed a Chapter 13 petition and sought to set aside the fore-
closure sale under both Durrett and section 547. The bankruptcy court found
that the foreclosure sale price represented only sixty-five percent of the fair
market value of the mortgaged real estate, which the court had determined to
be $24,000. Since the 70% Durrett standard was not satisfied, the court held
that the foreclosure sale was a fraudulent transfer. Alternatively, however, the
court held that the foreclosure sale constituted a voidable preference under
section 547. According to the court, each of the six preference criteria was
satisfied. The court reasoned that the foreclosure sale effected a transfer of the
debtor-mortgagor's property on account of an antecedent debt. It also found
the debtor to be insolvent at the time of the foreclosure sale and determined
that the timing of the sale and the Chapter 13 filing complied with the ninety
day requirement. Moreover, the court concluded that:
It is clear that under a Chapter 7 liquidation, [the mortgagee], as a fully
secured creditor, would be entitled to receive the full value of their $15,044
claim upon the disposition of the secured property. However, [mortgagee]
would be entitled to no more than the amount of their claim. Yet, by reason
of this foreclosure, [mortgagee] is receiving property with a market value sev-
eral thousand dollars in excess of the amount of their claim. Thus, it becomes
evident that the foreclosure sale did enable [mortgagee] to receive more than
219. See G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 137, § 8.8.
220. See 11 U.S.C. § 547(b) (1982); see also Collier, supra note 11, § 547.01; In
re Wheeler, 34 Bankr. 818 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1983).
221. See In re Wheeler, 34 Bankr. 818 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1983); In re Fountain,
32 Bankr. 965 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 1983).
222. 34 Bankr. 818 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. 1983).
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they would in a Chapter 7 liquidation. 223
While Durrett and the section 547 approach espoused by Wheeler both
serve a policy of avoiding mortgagee windfalls and protecting mortgagors and
unsecured creditors, they differed significantly in their impact on the foreclo-
sure process. For example, while section 547 may be asserted only against
mortgagee purchasers, Durrett is available against third party purchasers as
well. Moreover, while the Durrett avoidance period is one year, for section 547
it is ninety days. On the other hand, since the focus under the preference ap-
proach is on whether the mortgagee-purchaser received "more" than it would
have under a Chapter 7 liquidation, unlike Durrett, it might be used to recap-
ture property where more than seventy percent of its fair market value was
paid at the foreclosure sale.224
An argument can be made that the Wheeler analysis misreads the pur-
pose of section 547.225 This line of reasoning stresses that the latter section is
applicable only to the extent that a creditor gets paid up to the full amount of
her debt and not in those situations where she receives more than full pay-
ment. The excess, under this reasoning, is not a preference, but rather a fraud-
ulent transfer voidable under either section 548 or, assuming state law is being
utilized, section 544(b). In other words, if a creditor who is owed $1,000
would have received $300 in a Chapter 7 liquidation, and is paid $1,200 by
the insolvent debtor within ninety days of bankruptcy, $700 is a preferential
transfer while the $200 excess can only be a fraudulent transfer.
This argument is, however, unpersuasive. For one thing, it reaches the
ironic conclusion that section 547 may be used to deal with the lesser of two
wrongs-namely, the transfer that gives a creditor up to the full amount of
her claim-but is unavailing to the extent the transfer gives her more than she
is due. The more blameworthy creditor conduct must be dealt with, under this
reasoning, only as a fraudulent conveyance. However unsatisfying such a con-
clusion may seem intuitively, it could nevertheless be defended if the language
of section 547 either compelled such a result or was at least ambiguous. After
all, Congress certainly has the prerogative to treat the problems of full pay-
ment and overpayment separately. The problem with this reasoning, however,
is that the language of section 547 literally applies to the Wheeler-type fact
situation. Indeed, since Wheeler, the 1984 amendment to the Code's general
definition of "transfer" to include "foreclosure of the debtor's equity of re-
demption" actually reinforces the application of section 547 in such foreclo-
sure contexts. 226 Moreover, even though Durrett and Wheeler both serve simi-
lar policy objectives, the impact of Wheeler on state foreclosure practice is, as
we have seen, less extreme than that of Durrett. Thus, if one attributes to
223. Id. at 822.
224. See Henning, supra note 100, at 275 n.110.
225. For further criticism of the preference approach in the foreclosure context,
see Zinman, Houle & Weiss, supra note 212, at 985.
226. See supra text accompanying note 185.
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Congress an intent to deal with such problems in a manner less burdensome on
state prerogatives, section 547 furthers that intent more than Durrett. In any
event, it seems difficult to fault any court for refusing to read into the other-
wise plain language of section 547 a meaning that would confer a windfall on
a mortgagee at the expense of the debtor and his unsecured creditors.
So long as Durrett holds sway, the Wheeler preference approach will
probably receive little attention. However, in those circuits where Durrett is
not followed, the preference concept assumes greater importance. Indeed, this
will especially be true if Durrett is either overruled or repealed by Congress.
C. Reforming the Foreclosure Process
Ultimately, the long-term solution to the problems dealt with by Durrett
and the preference approach lies in a major structural reform of the foreclo-
sure system. The foreclosure sale process, whether judicial or under a power of
sale, is hardly designed to bring a fair price for mortgaged real estate. Fre-
quently, the mortgagee is not only the foreclosure sale purchaser, but the only
bidder attending the sale. There are several reasons for this phenomenon.
First, because the mortgagee can bid up to the amount of the mortgage debt
without putting up new cash, he has a distinct bidding advantage over a third
party bidder, who will have out-of-pocket expense from the first dollar bid.
Second, while foreclosure statutes require notice by publication to potential
third party bidders, the notice, especially in urban areas, is published in legal
newspapers of limited circulation. Moreover, because the publication is techni-
cal in nature, a potential third party purchaser has little idea what real estate
is being sold. Third, many potential third party purchasers are reluctant to
buy land at a foreclosure sale because of the difficulty of ascertaining if a
purchaser will receive good and marketable title. Fourth, when a mortgagee
forecloses on improved real estate, potential bidders often find it difficult to
inspect the premises prior to sale. While it may be in the self-interest of the
mortgagor to allow third party inspection of the premises, mortgagors who are
about to lose their real estate through a foreclosure sale understandably are
reluctant to cooperate.
Traditional legislative attempts to remedy the abuses of the foreclosure
sale process have proved inadequate at best. For example, while anti-deficiency
legislation limits the mortgagee/purchaser from using a deficiency to com-
pound the mortgagor's plight, it does nothing to encourage bidding above the
amount of the mortgage debt. Moreover, the advantages of statutory redemp-
tion may be more illusory than real. Because it uses the foreclosure sale price
as the redemption amount and affords redemption rights to a wide variety of
lien creditors as well as the mortgagor, it arguably encourages those who take
part at the sale to bid higher as a means of protecting their prospective
purchase from loss by redemption. However, it is equally likely that the defea-
sible nature of the purchaser's title coupled with the fact that the mortgagor
often retains possession during the redemption period serve to suppress rather
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than enhance bidding and, hence, may depress the ultimate foreclosure
price.227
A more fundamental reform of the foreclosure sale sysfem is necessary.
Not only should the goal be fewer deficiency judgments, but more frequent
and large surpluses which benefit junior lienholders as well as mortgagors.
Such a legislative approach should incorporate at least two components. First,
the sale should be conducted by customary commercial methods used in the
sale of real estate in a non-foreclosure setting, including the use of real estate
brokers and normal commercial descriptive and pictorial advertising. Second,
the person who conducts the sale should be a truly independent public official
and should be given a strong incentive to achieve the highest possible foreclo-
sure price. He should have substantial experience and expertise in real estate
matters. While the title for this person is not particularly important, the one
who now conducts foreclosure sales is often called a "trustee," and that title is
probably as appropriate as any other.228 To implement this latter concept, leg-
islation should specify a reasonable time, e.g., ninety days, during which the
trustee could sell the property by usual commercial means. The method of
compensating the trustee should encourage him to obtain the highest possible
sale price. For example, if the sale price does not exceed the mortgage debt,
the trustee's fee should be relatively low, perhaps a fixed amount. If the fore-
closure sale price exceeds the mortgage debt, the trustee should receive a per-
centage of the excess that increases as the excess increases.229
Under the scheme outlined above, a prospective purchaser would deal
with the trustee in much the same way as he would deal with a seller of real
estate in a normal sale context, using the customary earnest money contract
and title examination procedures. If the trustee could not sell the property
during the statutory time period, a regular public auction of the real estate
would be conducted. On the other hand, if the trustee and a potential pur-
chaser agree on sale terms, the trustee would be required to notify the mortga-
gor and junior lienholders of the proposed sale price. If neither the mortgagor
nor any junior lienholders object within a short time (say, seven days), the
transaction between the trustee and the purchaser would be consummated. If,
however, the mortgagor or a junior lienor objects to the sale, the trustee would
be required to hold a public auction. This procedure would estop the mortga-
gor or junior lienholders from subsequently attacking a sale between the trus-
227. G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 137, § 8.4.
228. Colorado currently uses a public trustee system. See COLO. REV. STAT. §§
38-37-101 to -139 (1973 & Cum. Supp. 1980). The governor appoints the trustee in
first and second class counties. In smaller counties, the county treasurer is the public
trustee. Id. § 38-37-102 (1973). Under the author's proposal, the local county court or
the governor should appoint the public trustee to ensure adequate expertise and experi-
ence; he should not be elected.
229. For a detailed explanation of how one such compensation system would op-
erate, see Nelson, Deficiency Judgments After Real Estate Foreclosures in Missouri:
Some Modest Proposals, 47 Mo. L. REV. 151, 164 n.67 (1982).
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tee and a purchaser. If the real estate sells for less than the mortgage debt
whether by negotiated sale or at auction, the mortgagee could seek a defi-
ciency judgment. The amount of the deficiency would be the difference be-
tween the sale price and the mortgage debt and would not be subject to other
anti-deficiency limitations. 30
Such a system would have weaknesses. It would be more time-consuming
and costly than current power of sale foreclosure practice. Mortgagors, not-
withstanding their self-interest in obtaining the highest possible price for the
mortgage real estate, may discourage physical inspection of improved real es-
tate. Moreover, in economically depressed periods, the proposed system proba-
bly would not yield a higher price than would result under the current prac-
tice. Nevertheless, under most economic conditions, it should result in
foreclosure sale prices that more closely approximate the fair market value of
the foreclosed real estate. Such higher prices not only would compensate for
the increased costs of the system but also might provide a surplus that would
benefit the mortgagor and junior lienholders. 23 1 In addition, higher prices
should reduce substantially the incidence of deficiency proceedings. Even in
the worst case, the proposed system would not result in prices below those
obtained under current practices. Under such a system, the Durrett doctrine,
the preference approach as well as statutory redemption would be both unnec-
essary and self-defeating.
Several additional observations are appropriate. First, such a system
would probably prove impractical in states with pervasive statutory redemp-
tion schemes because the prospect of receiving a defeasible title probably dis-
courages third party interest and bidding.232 Second, because the proposed sys-
tem focuses on the mechanics of the sale rather than on the foreclosure
proceeding itself, it can be utilized with judicial as well as power of sale fore-
closure. As we emphasized earlier, however, because we believe that power of
230. This proposal is similar in some respects to UNIF. LAND TRANSACrioNs Acr
§ 3-508, 13 U.L.A. 545, 702 (1980), which was promulgated by the National Confer-
ence of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, but has not been adopted by any state.
According to ULTA § 3-508(a), in power of sale foreclosures, the
sale may be made at public sale or by private negotiation, by one or more
contracts, as a unit or in parcels, at any time and place, and on any terms
including sale on credit, but every aspect of the sale, including the method,
advertising, time, place and terms, must be reasonable.
Unlike the author's proposal, however, the uniform act "does not require that the sale
be conducted by a disinterested third party such as a trustee." Id. § 3-508, Comment 1.
Thus, the mortgagee could conduct the sale under the uniform act. Commentators have
criticized the uniform act's assumption that the mortgagee's interest is always to maxi-
mize the foreclosure price. See Kuklin, The Uniform Land Transactions Act: Article 3,
11 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 12 (1976); Washburn, The Judicial and Legislative
Response to Price Inadequacy in Mortgage Foreclosure Sales, 53 S. CAL. L. REV. 843,
938 (1980).
231. Normally, junior lienholders have priority over the mortgagor with respect
to any foreclosure surplus. See G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 137, § 7.31.
232. See G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 137, § 8.4.
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sale foreclosure can be constitutional as well as efficient, 233 a power of sale
approach is probably preferable. Moreover, such a system need not be unfair
to residential mortgagors and others thought to need special protection. The
time period prior to the sale could, for example, be longer for such parties
than for commercial mortgagors. Finally, perhaps such a system should come
from Congress rather than the state legislatures. 2 Because the mortgage
market is pervasively national in scope and its impact on the national economy
increasingly significant, the traditional state-by-state approach to real estate
foreclosure is a luxury of federalism we can ill continue to afford.
VI. RENTS IN BANKRUPTCY
Mortgagees commonly rely not only on real estate itself as security for
the mortgage debt, but also on the rents and profits it produces.23 5 Sometimes
access to rents is gained through the appointment of a receiver. Such receiver-
ships typically are created after mortgagor default and incident to foreclo-
sure.236 Mortgagees also frequently find comfort in mortgage clauses or sepa-
rate agreements by which the mortgagor assigns the rents and profits as
additional security for the debt. Such assignment agreements usually are not
triggered until the mortgagee takes certain affirmative steps to activate
them.237 Typical of this approach is the Texas formulation that holds rent as-
signments ineffective "until the mortgagee obtains possession of the property,
or impounds the rents, or secures the appointment of a receiver, or takes some
other similar action." 2
Once a mortgagor files a bankruptcy petition, an important question
arises as between the trustee in bankruptcy, who represents the unsecured
creditors, and the mortgagee as to whether the mortgagee has a valid security
interest in rents collected from the mortgaged real estate during the pendency
of the bankruptcy proceeding. This issue can be crucial for the mortgagee
when the mortgage debt is not fully secured by the real estate. The ability to
gain access to the rents under such circumstances could well determine the
extent to which the mortgagee joins the ranks of the bankrupt's unsecured
creditors.
Prior to 1979, the federal courts of appeal were divided as to what law
governed entitlement to rents during this post-petition period. A majority of
the circuits took the position that the mortgagee's rights should be governed
by the state law which would have applied.239 Thus, the mortgagee was re-
233. Id. at § 7.30.
234. Id.
235. G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 137, § 4.35.
236. Id. at §§ 4.33-.34.
237. Id. at § 4.35.
238. Taylor v. Brennen, 621 S.W.2d 592, 594 (Tex. 1981). See G. NELSON & D.
WHITMAN, supra note 137, § 4.35.
239. See In re American Fuel & Power Co., 151 F.2d 1242 (6th Cir. 1945);
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quired to take those steps, either by leave of or through the bankruptcy court,
as would have been necessary to activate its rights under state law. If, for
example, a mortgagee was relying on a rents and profits clause, but state law
required the appointment of a receiver for its activation, the majority of fed-
eral decisions required that the bankruptcy court apply the same standard. A
minority of federal circuits, however, utilized a federal rule of equity that af-
forded the mortgagee a security interest in the rents even if state law failed to
recognize such an interest.24
0
The foregoing conflict was resolved in Butner v. United States, 41 in
which the Supreme Court endorsed the majority view and held that state law
governed in determining whether the mortgagee had a valid security interest
in rents collected during bankruptcy. According to the Supreme Court, the
bankruptcy court "should take whatever steps are necessary to ensure that the
mortgagee is afforded. . . the same protection he would have under state law
if no bankruptcy had ensued. ' '24
2
Because Butner was decided under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 and not
under the Bankruptcy Code, some doubt has been raised as to its current va-
lidity. Under section 552(b) of the Code,
[e]xcept as provided in section 363. . . if the [mortgagor] and a [mortgagee]
enter into a security agreement before [the filing of a bankruptcy petition]
and if the security interest created by such security agreement extends to
property of the [mortgagor] acquired before the [the filing] and to proceeds,
product, offspring, rents or profits of such property, then such security interest
extends to such. . . rents or profits acquired by the estate after [the filing] to
the extent provided by such security agreement and by applicable nonbank-
ruptcy law, except to the extent that the court, after notice and a hearing and
based on the equities of the case, orders otherwise.24 3
While the foregoing language "essentially codifies Congress' deference to state
law in this area, '24 4 the exceptions could be viewed as affording a bankruptcy
court the discretion in certain situations to alter the Butner state law
mandate. 24
5
Tower Grove Bank & Trust Co. v. Weinstein, 119 F.2d 120 (8th Cir. 1941); In re
Hotel St. James Co., 65 F.2d 82 (9th Cir. 1933); In re Brose, 254 F. 664 (2d Cir.
1918); see also Fidelity Bankers Life Ins. Co., v. Williams, 506 F.2d 1242 (4th Cir.
1974).
240. See In re Pittsburgh-Duquesne Dev. Co., 482 F.2d 243 (3d Cir. 1973); In re
Wakey, 50 F.2d 869 (7th Cir. 1931); Bindseil v. Liberty Trust Co., 248 F. 112 (3d Cir.
1917).
241. 440 U.S. 48 (1979).
242. Id. at 56.
243. See 11 U.S.C. § 552(b) (1982).
244. Note, Assignment of Rents Clauses Under California Law and in Bank-
ruptcy: Strategy for the Secured Creditor, 31 HAST. L.J. 1433, 1440 (1980). For an-
other excellent analysis of Butner, see Randolph, The Mortgagee's Interest in Rents:
Some Policy Considerations and Proposals, 29 U. KAN. L. REv. 1 (1980).
245. Note, supra note 244, at 1440.
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This argument was rejected by the United States Court of Appeals for
the Fifth Circuit in In re Village Properties24 6 Shortly after defaulting on a
deed of trust containing an assignment of rents clause, the mortgagor filed a
Chapter 11 petition. Three months thereafter, the bankruptcy court granted
the mortgagee's request for relief from the automatic stay, and a day later the
deed of trust was foreclosed. The mortgagee was the purchaser. Because the
value of the real estate was apparently less than the mortgage debt, mortgagee
filed a claim for the amount of the deficiency and sought to satisfy this claim
by asserting a security interest in the rents collected from the mortgaged real
estate between the date of mortgagor default and the foreclosure sale. The
bankruptcy court, relying on Texas law, denied the mortgagee's request and
the district court affirmed. The court of appeals agreed with the two lower
courts and held (1) that the mortgagee's rights under the rents clause were
governed by Texas law and (2) that those courts correctly interpreted and
applied that law.
The court of appeals acknowledged that section 552(b) permits a bank-
ruptcy court, "based on the equities of the case," to deviate from state law.247
However, it noted that the bankruptcy judge in this case had found no equita-
ble reason for such a deviation. Moreover, the court stressed, the legislative
history regarding the "equities of the case" exception indicates its purpose was
"to cover cases where an expenditure of the estate's funds increases the value
of the collateral. . . . [It] gives as an example the situation where raw materi-
als are converted into inventory at the expense of the estate (which would thus
deplete the fund available for general unsecured creditors). 24s
The mortgagee also sought to use the section 363 exception to escape the
application of Texas law. That section protects parties with an interest in cash
collateral and forbids the trustee or the debtor-in-possession from using, sell-
ing, or leasing such collateral unless each entity having an "interest" in it
consents or the bankruptcy court so authorizes.2 49 Under the definition then in
effect, "cash collateral" meant "cash . . or other cash equivalents in which
the estate and an entity other than the estate have an interest." The mortga-
gee argued that rents are "cash collateral" and that its assignment created a
lien or interest in them. Thus, the mortgagee asserted, its interest in the rents
could be protected by the bankruptcy court irrespective of state law. The
debtor, however, argued that bankruptcy courts "must turn to state law to
determine whether and at what time a mortgagee has an interest in the rents
because it is only at that time that it becomes 'cash collateral'. '250 The court
of appeals agreed with this latter argument:
We reject [mortgagee's] unsubstantiated reasoning that Congress in-
246. 723 F.2d 441 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 104 S. Ct. 2350 (1984).
247. Id. at 444.
248. Id. (citations omitted).
249. See 11 U.S.C. § 363 (1982).
250. 723 F.2d at 444.
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tended for section 363 to preempt state law which traditionally determines the
property rights at dispute in this case. "[S]tate-created property rights, in a
bankruptcy context, will not be destroyed by implication." . . Moreover, the
[legislative history], on which [mortgagee] relies, provides that rents received
"before or after the commencement of the case would be cash collateral to the
extent that they are subject to a lien." This language mirrors the provision in
section 552(b) which provides that a security interest will exist "to the extent
provided by such security agreement and by applicable nonbankruptcy law
... " Thus, if [mortgagee's] claim fails under section 552(b), 363 is to no
avail.251
Consequently, the court of appeals concluded that "the Butner decision re-
mains unscathed by the new Bankruptcy Code. ' 252 The court found further
comfort in the fact that numerous other decisions assumed the continued va-
lidity of Butner.253
Next, the court of appeals focused on whether the mortgagee had satisfied
Texas requirements for perfection of an interest in the rents. It noted that the
mortgagee had failed to petition the bankruptcy court for the "appointment of
a receiver to collect rents for its benefit," for an "order of sequestration" or for
any other order to impound rents.2 54 At least, it concluded the "or takes some
other similar action" requirement of Texas case law "encompasses perfection
of a mortgagee's interest by petitioning for sequestration and the like. '215
Shortly after Village Properties was decided, Congress, as part of the
Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, amended sec-
tion 363(a) to provide that cash collateral "includes the proceeds, products,
offspring, rents, or profits of property subject to a security interest as provided
in section 552(b) . . .whether existing before or after the commencement of a
[bankruptcy] case ... 256 Coming so close on the heels of Village Properties,
it could be argued that Congress meant to make plain not only that rents can
be cash collateral, but also that an assignment of such rents is enforceable by
bankruptcy courts irrespective of state law. However, even assuming, as the
Village Properties court was willing to do, that rents are "cash collateral," one
is still confronted with the "have an interest" language of section 363(a),
which was unaffected by the amendment. Nothing in the amendment suggests
251. Id. (citations omitted).
252. Id.
253. In re Jenkins, 13 Bankr. 721, 723 (Bankr. D. Col. 1981), rev'd on other
grounds, 19 Bankr. 105, 107 (D.C. Col. 1982); In re Oak Glen R-Vee, 8 Bankr. 213,
216 n.3 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1981); In re Gaslight Village, Inc., 6 Bankr. 871, 874
(Bankr. D. Conn. 1980); In re Hellenschmidt, 5 Bankr. 758, 760 (Bankr. D. Col.
1980); In re Wheeler, 5 Bankr. 600, 603 (Bankr. N.D. Ga. 1980); In re Jeffers, 3
Bankr. 49, 56 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1980); see also, In re Southern Gardens, Inc., 39
Bankr. 671, 672 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1982); In re Kuhn Constr. Co., 11 Bankr. 746
(Bankr. S.D. W. Va. 1981).
254. In re Village Properties, 723 F.2d 441, 446 (5th Cir. 1984).
255. Id. at 446.
256. See 11 U.S.C.A. § 363(a) (West Supp. 1984).
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that the latter language is no longer to be governed by state law. Thus, it
seems unlikely that Congress intended to alter the Butner state law mandate.
At least, such a preference for state law should not, to use language endorsed
by Village Properties, be deemed "destroyed by implication. ' 257
Assuming the continued vitality of Butner and Village Properties, certain
practical observations are appropriate. First, to the extent that the mortgagee
has gained access to the rents and profits prior to bankruptcy by taking lawful
affirmative steps under state law, it will continue to be entitled to them during
bankruptcy. Such pre-bankruptcy actions would include, for example, securing
the appointment of a receiver or otherwise attaching or sequestering the rents
and profits under state law.258 Of course, if an assignment of rents clause is
automatically effective under state law, such affirmative action would be un-
necessary.259 Second, where the mortgagee has not activated its security inter-
est in the rents prior to bankruptcy, it may perfect its interest thereafter by
taking those steps, either by leave of or through the bankruptcy court, as
would have been necessary to trigger its rights under state law.2 60 While some-
times this may require that the bankruptcy court actually appoint a receiver,
there have been cases where bankruptcy courts, relying on state law, have
found that the simple request for a receivership 21 or the mere demand on the
trustee that rents be set aside will suffice. 2 ' Assuming the requisite steps are
taken, the assignment clause will then become effective and subsequent rents
should be applied to the satisfaction of the mortgage debt.
VII. CONCLUSION
The impact of mortgagor bankruptcy on the real estate mortgagee can be
both substantial and frustrating. Not only will the mortgagee confront the ini-
tial obstacle of the automatic stay, it may also be forced to defend its mort-
gage from trustee or debtor avoidance in a forum whose natural bias favors
enlargement of the bankrupt's estate for the benefit of unsecured creditors.
Moreover, even where the mortgage itself is invulnerable to such attack, the
debt it secures is subject to de-acceleration under Taddeo in Chapter 13 pro-
ceedings and under a similar theory in the Chapter 11 context. Finally, even
consummated foreclosures are vulnerable to attacks under Durrett and its
257. In re Village Properties, 723 F.2d 441, 445 (5th Cir. 1984) (quoting In re
Jeffers, 3 Bankr. 49, 56 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. 1980)).
258. See G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 137, § 4.35.
259. Id.
260. In re Village Properties, 723 F.2d 441 (5th Cir. 1984); In re Southern Gar-
dens, Inc., 39 Bankr. 671 (Bankr. S.D. Ill. 1982); In re Oak Glen R-Vee, 8 Bankr. 213,
216 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 1981); see also Groves v. Fresno Guar. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 373
F.2d 440, 442-43 (9th Cir. 1967); Pollack v. Sampsell, 174 F.2d 415, 418-19 (9th Cir.
1949).
261. See, e.g., In re Flower City Nursing Home, 38 Bankr. 642 (Bankr.
W.D.N.Y. 1984).
262. In re Southern Gardens, Inc., 39 Bankr. 671 (Bankr. S.D. I11. 1982).
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preference theory counterpart.
It would be a mistake, however, to overemphasize the significance of
many of the foregoing concerns. Bankruptcy courts frequently lift stays expe-
ditiously. Moreover, while delay is probably endemic to reorganization pro-
ceedings, Chapter 7 liquidations are consummated relatively rapidly. Nor-
mally mortgage security and priority are preserved irrespective of the
bankruptcy proceeding. Even Taddeo and its Chapter 11 de-acceleration coun-
terpart should not represent an overriding concern. Not only do state statutes
frequently afford mortgagors the right to defeat acceleration prior to foreclo-
sure by the tender of arrearages, so also do pervasively used mortgage
forms. 263 For example, the Federal National Mortgage Association-Federal
Home Loan Mortgage Corporation Uniform Mortgage and Deed of Trust
Covenants-Single Family, widely used by lenders who desire to retain the
option to sell their mortgages on the secondary market, specifically affords the
mortgagor the right until five days prior to a foreclosure sale to reinstate the
mortgage by payment of arrearages. 26 4
The use of Durrett and related theories to invalidate previously consum-
mated foreclosure sales is a matter of more serious concern. Any post-sale
period of title defeasibility doubtless discourages foreclosure sale bidding. In-
deed, because Missouri statutory redemption is unavailable if a third party
purchases, such parties have heretofore been unconcerned about its conse-
quences. As a result, Durrett may alter third party bidding practice to a
greater degree in Missouri than in those states where such purchasers are not
"protected from statutory redemption claims. This is admittedly a troubling
prospect. In this respect, the impact of the preference theory is less profound
because it cannot be used against third party purchasers and thus will not
discourage bidding by such parties. The foregoing concerns notwithstanding, it
is difficult both legally and morally to justify a system that too often allows a
mortgagee purchaser to acquire property worth more than its debt at the ex-
pense of the mortgagor and his unsecured creditors. Moreover, whatever their
merits, Durrett and its related theories force the legal and financial commu-
nity to confront the inadequacies of the current foreclosure system.
The foregoing, however, should not be interpreted as a wholesale endorse-
ment of Durrett or its related offshoots as a permanent part of the foreclosure
landscape. The long-term solution to the problems they address lies in a major
structural reform of state foreclosure practices. Earlier in this article, a propo-
sal for reform was examined. Such a system, it is hoped, would enhance the
likelihood of foreclosure surpluses and reduce the number of deficiency judg-
ments, a result that would benefit unsecured creditors as well as mortgagors
and junior lienors. Under such a system, Durrett, its preference counterpart,
263. See G. NELSON & D. WHITMAN, supra note 137, § 7.7.
264. FNMA/FHLMC Uniform Mortgage and Deed of Trust Cove-
nants-Single Family, § 18.
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Taddeo applied in the post-foreclosure stage, and statutory redemption would
be unnecessary and self-defeating.
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